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Marc McAllister* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides an accused 
the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”1 As inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court, the right of confrontation 
assures criminal defendants the opportunity to cross-examine individuals 
who present testimony against them.2 
The confrontation right applies not only to testimony captured at 
trial but also to similar out-of-court statements.3 For nearly twenty-five 
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the Lower Courts Taketh Away, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 663 (2008); and Two-Way Video Trial Testi-
mony and the Confrontation Clause: Fashioning a Better Craig Test in Light of Crawford, 34 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 835 (2007). 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (“Where testimonial evidence is at 
issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”). While the Crawford Court focused on cross-examination as 
the core of the confrontation right, the constitutional phrase “confronted with” is subject to interpre-
tation. Many judges have interpreted the phrase to guarantee both “cross-examination” of an accus-
ing witness and a “face-to-face” meeting between accuser and accused. See, e.g., Mattox v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (interpreting the Confrontation Clause as requiring both cross-
examination and face-to-face confrontation). More modern courts often emphasize one right over the 
other. Compare Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55–57 (stating that “a prior opportunity to cross-examine” the 
adverse witness is “dispositive,” and limiting Mattox’s holding to “an adequate opportunity to con-
front the witness”), with California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(“Simply as a matter of English, [the Confrontation Clause] may be read to confer nothing more than 
a right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial.”), and Maryland v. Craig, 
497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“‘[T]o confront’ plainly means to encounter face to 
face, whatever else it may mean in addition.”). 
 3. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50–51. These issues are governed by different tests. Craig go-
verns the manner in which in-court testimony may be taken, whereas Crawford and its progeny 
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years, courts adhered to the 1980 United States Supreme Court decision 
in Ohio v. Roberts,4 which allowed out-of-court statements to be admit-
ted when those statements fell within a “firmly-rooted hearsay excep-
tion” or were otherwise deemed “reliable.”5 Under the Roberts standard, 
prosecutors were often able to admit evidence against an accused in the 
absence of actual confrontation—meaning there was no opportunity for 
cross-examination.6 
Over time, the Roberts standard proved easily manipulable by 
courts7 and “often fail[ed] to protect against paradigmatic confrontation 
violations.”8 To correct the problem of unbridled judicial discretion and 
to better ensure the confrontation right, the Court replaced the Roberts 
test with a rigid cross-examination requirement9 in its 2004 decision, 
Crawford v. Washington.10 
In overruling Roberts, the Crawford Court’s goals were to prevent 
testimonial evidence from reaching the factfinder absent adversarial test-
ing,11 and to remove the judicial discretion that had permitted such core 
confrontation violations.12 Crawford stated each of these goals explicitly. 
For example, the Crawford Court declared that its goal was to prevent 
“open-ended [confrontation] exceptions . . . [being] developed by the 
courts.”13 Further emphasizing the Court’s desire to limit judicial discre-
tion, Crawford declared, “[The Framers] . . . knew that judges . . . could 
not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people . . . . They 
were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands.”14 
                                                                                                             
determine what out-of-court statements are subject to the confrontation right. See generally Craig, 
497 U.S. 836. 
 4. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. 
 5. Id. at 66. 
 6. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“[The Confrontation Clause] commands, not that evidence be 
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.”). 
 7. Id. at 63 (“The [Roberts] framework is so unpredictable that it fails to provide meaningful 
protection from even core confrontation violations. Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely sub-
jective, concept. There are countless factors bearing on whether a statement is reliable . . . .”). 
 8. Id. at 60. 
 9. Id. at 61. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 63 (“The unpardonable vice of the Roberts test . . . is . . . its demonstrated capacity to 
admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.”). 
 12. Id. at 62 (“The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence . . . based on a mere judicial 
determination of reliability. It thus replaces the constitutionally prescribed method of assessing re-
liability [i.e., actual confrontation] with a wholly foreign one [i.e., admission of testimonial evidence 
despite no actual confrontation].”). 
 13. Id. at 54. 
 14. Id. at 67–68. 
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Despite the intentions in Crawford, only seven years later, the very 
deficiencies of the Roberts rule have been revived.15 The erosion of 
Crawford has occurred through the Court’s distinction between testi-
monial hearsay, which requires confrontation,16 and nontestimonial hear-
say, which does not.17 Although this distinction appears to create a 
bright-line rule, the testimonial/nontestimonial framework is just as ma-
nipulable as the Roberts rule. 
While the potential problem of malleability existed not long after 
Crawford,18 the Court’s most recent decision, Michigan v. Bryant,19 sig-
                                                 
 15. Justice Scalia openly criticized this aspect of the Court’s present jurisprudence in his dis-
sent in Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). Justice Scalia noted, “[Bryant] recedes from 
Crawford [by] requir[ing] judges to conduct ‘open-ended balancing tests’ and ‘amorphous, if not 
entirely subjective,’ inquiries into the totality of the circumstances . . . .” Id. at 1175 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63, 68). Yet, “[the Court rejected] multifactor balancing for 
reliability in Crawford [as against the Framers’ design] . . . . It was judges’ open-ended determina-
tion of what was reliable that violated the trial rights of Englishmen in the political trials of the 16th 
and 17th centuries.” Id. at 1176 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68). According to Scalia, “The Fra-
mers placed the Confrontation Clause in the Bill of Rights to ensure that those abuses . . . would not 
be repeated in this country.” Id. 
 16. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823–26 (2006) (answering affirmatively the ques-
tion of “whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay”). 
 17. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (“Where [a statement is deemed nontestimonial], the admissibili-
ty of [the] statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation 
Clause.”); see also id. at 1162 n.13 (“[T]he Confrontation Clause is not the only bar to admissibility 
of hearsay statements at trial. State and federal rules of evidence prohibit the introduction of hearsay, 
subject to exceptions. Consistent with those rules, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments may constitute a further bar to admission of, for example, unreliable evidence.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 18. Two years after the decision in Crawford, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the dif-
ferences between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay in cases involving police interrogation. 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 817. In the first of two consolidated cases, the Davis Court deemed nontestimoni-
al a recording of a 911 call made during an ongoing emergency, making the statement admissible in 
the absence of confrontation. Id. at 828–29. In the second of two consolidated cases, the Court 
deemed testimonial statements taken by police after they had secured the scene and had separated 
the declarant from the assailant. Id. at 829–30. 
Although Bryant has magnified the problem, even Davis employed what many courts interpreted 
as a totality-of-the-circumstances test. See, e.g., People v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205, 217 (Cal. 2007) (not-
ing that under Davis, “the primary purpose for which a statement was given and taken is to be de-
termined ‘objectively,’ considering all the circumstances that might reasonably bear on the intent of 
the participants in the conversation”); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 714 (Nev. 2006) (“Together, 
Crawford, Davis, and Hammon demonstrate that when determining whether a statement is testi-
monial, it is necessary to look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement.”); State 
v. Camarena, 145 P.3d 267, 274 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (“Under Davis, the proper inquiry is whether 
the totality of the ‘circumstances objectively indicat[e] that the primary purpose of the interrogation 
[was] to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.’” (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 
822)); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 142–43 (Tenn. 2007) (describing Tennessee’s “non-
exhaustive list of factors to aid in the determination of whether a particular statement is testimonial,” 
including eight numbered factors). 
In 2008, Michael D. Cicchini observed, “‘The new Davis test, much like the Roberts test, is in 
practice nothing more than a manipulable, open-ended balancing test that Crawford con-
demned . . . .’ [T]he multiple factors for determining whether a statement is testimonial invite a lack 
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nificantly magnified the problem. Under Roberts, courts employed a host 
of factors to determine whether a particular hearsay statement was suffi-
ciently reliable20 and invoked the same factors to justify opposite out-
comes, even with nearly identical facts.21 Reminiscent of Roberts, Bryant 
notes more than ten factors courts should use to distinguish testimonial 
statements from nontestimonial statements.22 Exacerbating the problem, 
Bryant instructs courts to consider “all relevant information” and to de-
cide each individual case in context,23 further increasing the likelihood of 
judicial manipulation.24 
Despite Crawford’s aims, Bryant assures a return to “open-ended 
[confrontation] exceptions”25—exactly what the Crawford Court sought 
to prevent.26 To restore the promise of Crawford, this Article proposes a 
bright-line test to replace Bryant’s totality-of-the-circumstances test, one 
that particularly governs out-of-court statements. Under my proposed 
test, any statements obtained from a would-be witness during the crime’s 
                                                                                                             
of uniformity in applying the new test.” Michael D. Cicchini, Judicial (In)Discretion: How Courts 
Circumvent the Confrontation Clause Under Crawford and Davis, 75 TENN. L. REV. 753, 779 
(2008) (quoting Josephine Ross, After Crawford Double-Speak: “Testimony” Does Not Mean Testi-
mony and “Witness” Does Not Mean Witness, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 193 (2006)). 
Davis is discussed further in Part II. 
 19. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143. 
 20. See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41 (applying a nine-factor reliability test); see also Snow-
den v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 43–44 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (summarizing Maryland law under 
Roberts as requiring a court to evaluate thirteen separate factors to determine whether an out-of-
court hearsay statement “bears ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’” (quoting Ohio v. Ro-
berts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36)). 
 21. Crawford itself is illustrative. In that case, Michael Crawford stabbed a man who allegedly 
tried to rape his wife Sylvia. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38. At Crawford’s attempted murder trial, the 
State sought to introduce a tape-recorded statement made by Sylvia to the police in which she de-
scribed the stabbing in a manner contrary to Michael’s self-defense claim. Id. at 38–40. Finding 
Sylvia’s statement reliable under the Roberts test, the trial court admitted the statement, id. at 40, and 
Michael was convicted, id. at 41. Illustrating the malleability of the Roberts test, the Washington 
Court of Appeals reversed, finding Sylvia’s statement unreliable due to critical differences between 
Michael and Sylvia’s versions of events. Id. In particular, the court found it significant that, among 
other things, Sylvia and Michael’s statements differed on whether Michael’s victim actually had 
something in his hand when he was stabbed. Id. Again reversing, a unanimous Washington Supreme 
Court deemed Sylvia’s statement reliable because it was nearly identical to Michael’s version of the 
events. See id. 
 22. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158–62; see also infra notes 93–105 and accompanying text. 
 23. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162 (“[C]ourts making a ‘primary purpose’ assessment should not be 
unjustifiably restrained from consulting all relevant information . . . .”). 
 24. Id. at 1174–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the ease in which the Bryant test can be ma-
nipulated to reach desired outcomes). Just as they did under Davis, courts are sure to develop addi-
tional factors under Bryant. See, e.g., State v. Warsame, 735 N.W.2d 684, 695 (Minn. 2007) (apply-
ing Davis and finding it significant that the interrogating officer did not take detailed notes while 
questioning the victim of a recent assault). 
 25. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54. 
 26. See infra Part III. 
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res gestae,27 whether volunteered or the result of interrogation,28 would 
be deemed nontestimonial and therefore exempt from confrontation. On 
the other hand, statements obtained from a would-be witness outside the 
res gestae of the crime would be deemed testimonial and therefore inad-
missible in the absence of confrontation. 
This proposed rule rests on the presumption that questioning and 
corresponding statements made during a crime’s res gestae are usually 
intended to resolve the crime and prevent the criminal from successfully 
escaping. While a crime is still occurring and the suspect is still on the 
loose, a declarant and interrogator are typically focused on assessing the 
situation, dealing with potential threats, and apprehending a perpetrator. 
The intent to record evidence for later use might be a factor at this time 
but generally is not the primary objective until the situation has been se-
cured. 
Alternatively, by the time the res gestae has ended, statements of a 
would-be witness, whether volunteered or made in response to structured 
questioning, would be deemed testimonial by most courts. This presump-
tion is supported by recent cases, many of which have deemed testimoni-
al a victim’s statements to police after the assailant’s arrest or separation 
from the declarant.29 
To preserve its bright-line nature, my proposed rule would apply to 
statements made to police and nonpolice interrogators. Regardless of the 
interrogator’s identity, accusatory statements made after a crime has been 
committed and after the assailant no longer poses a threat “do precisely 
what a witness does on direct examination,” thereby triggering the same 
                                                 
 27. As discussed in Part V, the proposed res gestae limitation would encompass a timeframe 
that begins with preparations for the crime and ends only when the assailant is either in custody or 
has reached a position of temporary safety. See infra notes 345–46 and accompanying text. 
 28. Although the issue is unresolved, the Supreme Court has suggested that volunteered state-
ments not made in response to interrogation might also be testimonial. See Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813, 822 n.1 (2006) (“Our holding refers to interrogations because . . . the statements in the 
cases presently before us are the products of interrogations . . . . This is not to imply, however, that 
statements made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial. The Framers 
were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-
ended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.”); see also Bryant, 131 
S. Ct. at 1169 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Clause applies to volunteered testimony as well as state-
ments solicited through police interrogation.” (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 n.1)). 
 29. See, e.g., Davis, 547 U.S. at 829–30 (deeming testimonial a victim’s statements to officers 
responding to a domestic violence complaint after police had secured the scene and had separated 
the abusive husband from declarant); State v. Fry, 926 N.E.2d 1239, 1260–61 (Ohio 2010) (deeming 
testimonial a victim’s statements to officers responding to a domestic violence complaint because 
defendant had already been arrested and removed from the premises); Henderson v. Commonwealth, 
710 S.E.2d 482, 493–95 (Va. Ct. App. 2011) (applying Bryant and deeming testimonial robbery 
victims’ statements to a detective that were made four days after one alleged robbery and several 
hours after another because “there was no evidence of any immediate threat to either the witnesses or 
the detective”). 
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confrontation concerns and making the accusation ripe for cross-
examination.30 
Before outlining the details of my proposed test, Part II of this Ar-
ticle summarizes the Supreme Court cases that establish the existing 
Confrontation Clause framework, particularly those that govern state-
ments made in response to interrogation: Crawford, Davis v. Washing-
ton, Hammon v. Indiana,31 and Bryant. This Part examines how the 
meaning of “testimonial” in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved 
to its current manipulable status after Bryant. 
Part III examines the primary method for evading confrontation—
manipulation of the testimonial/nontestimonial distinction, which is just 
one method of evasion among many.32 This Part summarizes the specific 
means courts have employed to manipulate the “primary-purpose” test, 
the overarching Bryant standard that determines whether a statement is 
testimonial.33 Methods of evasion discussed within this Part include se-
lective or inconsistent application of the factors discussed in Bryant, iso-
                                                 
 30. Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 (emphasis omitted). 
 31. Hammon is a companion case to Davis. See discussion infra notes 52–58 and accompany-
ing text. 
 32. My review of post-Crawford case law has uncovered at least seven methods courts have 
employed to evade confrontation. One additional method of evasion not discussed in this Article is 
the “not for the truth end run around,” under which a hearsay statement is admitted not for the truth 
of what it asserted but for some other purpose. See United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 635 (4th 
Cir. 2009). This potential “end run around Crawford” was summarized well in Johnson. There, the 
court explained: 
Crawford forbids the introduction of testimonial hearsay as evidence in itself, but it in no 
way prevents expert witnesses from offering their independent judgments merely because 
those judgments were in some part informed by their exposure to otherwise inadmissible 
evidence. 
 An expert witness’s reliance on evidence that Crawford would bar if offered direct-
ly only becomes a problem where the witness is used as little more than a conduit or 
transmitter for testimonial hearsay, rather than as a true expert whose considered opinion 
sheds light on some specialized factual situation. Allowing a witness simply to parrot 
“out-of-court testimonial statements of cooperating witnesses and confidential informants 
directly to the jury in the guise of expert opinion” would provide an end run around 
Crawford. 
Id. (quoting United States v. Lombardozzi, 491 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2007)). The Supreme Court 
recently granted certiorari in a case involving this issue. People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 
2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (mem.). The Bryant Court also addressed this issue. 
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160 n.11 (“[T]he Confrontation Clause is not implicated when statements are 
offered ‘for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.’” (quoting Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9 (2004))). Another method of evading the confrontation right is 
through liberal application of harmless error analysis. See, e.g., People v. Hudnall-Johnson, No. 
A119004, 2009 WL 499151, at *14 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2009) (deeming assault victim’s 
statements to police testimonial and thus improperly admitted at trial, but finding the error harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 33. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (suggesting that the primary-purpose test will determine 
whether a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial, even in cases not involving ongoing emergen-
cies). 
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lating one purpose among many concurrent purposes, and disregarding 
the testimonial nature of interrogations conducted by nonstate actors. 
Part IV details the ongoing expansion of the Confrontation Clause’s 
primary exceptions, forfeiture by wrongdoing and dying declarations. 
Forfeiture by wrongdoing is emphasized because, as compared to dying 
declarations, it is still subject to a great deal of ambiguity despite the 
Court’s attempt at clarification in Giles v. California.34 
Part V details my proposed bright-line substitute for Bryant’s totali-
ty-of-the-circumstances test, one more consistent with Crawford and less 
malleable than the Bryant test. Part VI concludes. 
II. THE TESTIMONIAL/NONTESTIMONIAL DISTINCTION 
This Part examines how the Court came to the current testimoni-
al/nontestimonial distinction. Crawford revolutionized Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence by establishing the testimonial/nontestimonial dis-
tinction, an improvement over the manipulable Roberts standard. Two 
years later, Davis clarified the meaning of “testimonial,” but it also 
proved to be somewhat manipulable. Bryant, the Court’s most recent 
decision in this area, has fully revived the flaws of Roberts. 
The Confrontation Clause assures the right of an accused “to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”35 As the text suggests, the 
confrontation right prevents a prosecutor from admitting into evidence 
the “unconfronted” statements of witnesses.36 The term “witnesses,” ac-
cording to Crawford, includes “those who ‘bear testimony.’”37 The 
phrase “confronted with” requires at least an opportunity to cross-
examine the accusing witness.38 
According to the Court, because the term “witnesses” encompasses 
those who bear testimony, the Confrontation Clause governs only testi-
                                                 
 34. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 36. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50–51. 
 37. Id. at 51 (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1828)). The Crawford Court explained that the text of the Confrontation Clause 
applies to “witnesses” against the accused—in other words, those who “bear testimony.” 
“Testimony,” in turn, is typically “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” [Under this formulation,] [a]n accuser who 
makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person 
who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not. 
Id. (citations omitted). According to Crawford, “The constitutional text . . . thus reflects an especial-
ly acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement.” Id. 
 38. Id. at 59 (“Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only 
where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine.”). 
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monial statements.39 If a hearsay statement is nontestimonial, the Con-
frontation Clause does not apply, and the statement will be admitted if 
governing hearsay law permits its introduction.40 On the other hand, if a 
statement is testimonial, the Sixth Amendment requires either (1) oppor-
tunity for cross-examination of the hearsay declarant in court, or (2) in 
the case of a declarant who is unavailable to testify, some prior opportu-
nity for cross-examination of that declarant.41 Once actual confrontation 
is assured, governing hearsay law determines whether the testimonial 
statement is admissible.42 Even testimonial statements may be admitted 
in the absence of confrontation under two Founding-era exceptions, 
which will be addressed in Part IV. 
Under this framework, when a prosecutor seeks to admit a hearsay 
statement against a criminal defendant, a court must first determine 
whether the statement is testimonial or nontestimonial.43 While Crawford 
did not provide a comprehensive definition of testimonial, the decision 
did contrast “a formal statement to government officers,” which would 
be testimonial,44 with “a casual remark to an acquaintance,” which would 
not.45 More broadly, Crawford noted that testimonial statements are 
those “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
                                                 
 39. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (“Only [testimonial] statements . . . cause 
the declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. It is the testimonial 
character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limita-
tions upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” (citation omitted)). 
 40. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). 
 41. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 (“Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been 
admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior op-
portunity to cross-examine.”). 
 42. Id. at 59 n.9. State courts often conduct state hearsay analysis before reaching a Confronta-
tion Clause issue, either as a routine or in order to prevent wasting time on federal constitutional 
issues when the case could be resolved on state-law grounds. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 197 P.3d 815, 
819 (Kan. 2008) (reordering the issues from how they were argued); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. 
S.P., 215 P.3d 847, 852 (Or. 2009) (en banc). 
 43. See State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 142–43 (Tenn. 2007) (“[A]fter Crawford, the thre-
shold question in any Confrontation Clause case is whether a challenged statement is testimonial or 
nontestimonial.” (quoting State v. Maclin, 183 S.W.3d 335, 345 (Tenn. 2006))). 
 44. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 45. Id. The Crawford Court also included “business records or statements in furtherance of a 
conspiracy” within its list of nontestimonial statements, id. at 56, but that statement should be read 
as a general rule only, as some business records could indeed qualify as testimonial, see Bryant, 131 
S. Ct. at 1175 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia explains, 
Hearsay law exempts business records . . . because businesses have a financial incentive 
to keep reliable records. The Sixth Amendment also generally admits business records in-
to evidence, but not because the records are reliable or because hearsay law says 
so . . . . The reliability logic of the business-record exception would extend to records 
maintained by neutral parties providing litigation-support services, such as evidence test-
ing. The Confrontation Clause is not so forgiving. Business records prepared specifically 
for use at a criminal trial are testimonial and require confrontation. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial.”46 Because a witness bears testimony by providing “[a] solemn 
declaration . . . for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact,”47 
“[t]he Confrontation Clause protects defendants only from hearsay 
statements that do the same.”48 
While Crawford explained that “[s]tatements taken by police offic-
ers in the course of interrogations are . . . testimonial,”49 the Court did 
not distinguish among different types of police interrogation. Crawford 
involved structured police questioning of an out-of-court declarant while 
in police custody50—a scenario bearing modern day resemblance to the 
core class of testimonial statements thought to be in the minds of the 
Sixth Amendment’s drafters.51 Just two years later, in Davis, the Court 
addressed more informal police interrogations.52 
In Davis, the Court considered statements made by an assault vic-
tim to a 911 dispatcher.53 In the companion case Hammon,54 the Court 
analyzed the admissibility of a victim’s statements made in response to 
police questioning at the scene of a recent domestic battery.55 
The Court deemed the statements nontestimonial in Davis,56 but it 
reached the opposite result in Hammon.57 In justifying that distinction, 
                                                 
 46. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (citations omitted) (quoting Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal 
Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-
9410)). 
 47. Id. at 71 (quoting 2 WEBSTER, supra note 37) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 
813, 823–24 (2006)). As the Davis Court declared, “Only [testimonial] statements . . . cause the 
declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. It is the testimonial 
character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay . . . .” Davis, 547 U.S. at 821 (citation 
omitted). 
 49. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. According to the Court, “Police interrogations bear a striking 
resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in England, . . . yet [such examinations] ha[ve] 
long been . . . a paradigmatic confrontation violation.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 50. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 51. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50 (“[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed was the . . . use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. It was these prac-
tices that the Crown deployed in notorious treason cases like [Sir Walter] Raleigh’s; that the Marian 
statutes invited; that English law’s assertion of a right to confrontation was meant to prohibit; and 
that the founding-era rhetoric decried. The Sixth Amendment must be interpreted with this focus in 
mind.”). 
 52. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 53. Id. at 826. Collectively, in these cases, the Court determined that “statements made to law 
enforcement personnel during a 911 call or at a crime scene are ‘testimonial’ and thus subject to the 
requirements of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 817. 
 54. Id. at 813. 
 55. See id. at 819–21. In that case, an officer who interviewed a domestic battery victim, who 
did not appear at the defendant’s trial, testified as to what the victim told him and authenticated an 
affidavit the victim prepared. Id. at 820. 
 56. Id. at 828–29. In reaching this result, the Court contrasted the purpose of the structured 
interrogation in Crawford, an interrogation “solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime,” 
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the Davis Court adopted the primary-purpose test, a test Bryant ratified 
and extended to other types of hearsay statements.58 According to Davis, 
“Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police inter-
rogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary pur-
pose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongo-
ing emergency.”59 In contrast, statements are testimonial when “there is 
no such ongoing emergency, and . . . the primary purpose of the interro-
gation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution.”60 The theory underlying this distinction is that 
“[w]hen . . . the primary purpose of an interrogation is to respond to an 
‘ongoing emergency,’ its purpose is not to create a record for trial and 
thus is not within the scope of the Clause.”61 
While Davis helped clarify the meaning of “testimonial” in the con-
text of police interrogation, the opinion left ambiguity in its wake.62 First, 
while Crawford’s “objective-witness” test focused on the declarant’s 
state of mind,63 Davis’s primary-purpose test seems to focus on the inter-
rogator’s intent.64 Second, the Court’s dichotomy between statements 
                                                                                                             
with that of the 911 call in Davis, an event “ordinarily not designed primarily to ‘establish or prove’ 
some past fact, but to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.” Id. at 826, 827. 
 57. Id. at 829–30. 
 58. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011) (suggesting that the primary-purpose test 
will continue to determine whether a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial, even in cases not 
involving ongoing emergencies). 
 59. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155. 
 62. See, e.g., State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. S.P., 178 P.3d 318, 325 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (“[The 
Davis rule] indicates that . . . the Court was looking to the purpose of the interrogator in asking the 
questions rather than the purpose of the declarant in making the statements. However, the Court’s 
further particularized observations about the circumstances in Davis and Hammon suggest that the 
inquiry is not so straightforward as simply discerning the intent of the questioner . . . . [Rather,] the 
Court referred to both the declarant’s and the questioner’s circumstances in comparing the circums-
tances in Davis and Hammon with those in Crawford . . . .”). 
 63. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) (broadly defining testimonial state-
ments as “[s]tatements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial” (quoting Brief for 
the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 
46, at 3)). 
 64. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 n.1. Perhaps recognizing this ambiguity, the Davis Court explained 
in a footnote that “when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not 
the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.” Id. While this 
passage of Davis appears to mandate a declarant-based primary-purpose inquiry, the Bryant Court 
disagreed. There, the Court declared: 
Davis’[s] language indicating that a statement’s testimonial or nontestimonial nature de-
rives from “the primary purpose of the interrogation” could be read to suggest that the re-
levant purpose is that of the interrogator. In contrast, footnote 1 in Davis explains, “[I]t is 
in the final analysis the declarant’s statements . . . that the Confrontation Clause requires 
us to evaluate.” Bryant draws on the footnote to argue that the primary purpose inquiry 
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made for the purpose of addressing an ongoing emergency versus state-
ments made for the purpose of establishing past events potentially rele-
vant to prosecution does not account for other potential purposes,65 nor 
does it resolve how to classify statements made with mixed purposes or 
questions posed with multiple motives. Finally, as in Crawford, the Da-
vis Court did not provide “an exhaustive classification of all [testimonial] 
statements.”66 For example, the Davis Court indicated in dicta that volun-
teered statements not made in response to interrogation might also be 
testimonial.67 
With so much left unresolved by Davis, elaboration of the testi-
monial/nontestimonial distinction has continued on a case-by-case basis. 
Lower courts post-Davis sometimes expanded the concept of “ongoing 
emergency”68 or otherwise distorted the primary-purpose test in a manner 
often leading to pro-prosecution outcomes.69 
                                                                                                             
must be conducted solely from the perspective of the declarant . . . . But this statement in 
footnote 1 of Davis merely acknowledges that the Confrontation Clause is not implicated 
when statements are offered “for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter 
asserted.” . . . The language in the footnote was not meant to determine how the courts 
are to assess the nature of the declarant’s purpose, but merely to remind readers that it is 
the statements, and not the questions, that must be evaluated under the Sixth Amendment. 
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160 n.11 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 
822 & n.1). 
 65. For example, an eyewitness to a crime might tell the police what she knows, and might 
provide very few details about the crime, for the sole purpose of ending her encounter with the po-
lice as soon as possible. Presumably, a statement made for any purpose other than that of establish-
ing past events potentially relevant to prosecution would be deemed nontestimonial. See, e.g., Panta-
no v. State, 138 P.3d 477, 483 (Nev. 2006) (deeming nontestimonial statements of a child sexual 
assault victim to her father because the father was “inquiring into the health, safety, and well-being 
of the child,” not gathering evidence for purposes of litigation). 
 66. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 67. Id. at 822 n.1 (“The Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination vo-
lunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to de-
tailed interrogation.”). 
 68. Under Davis, an ongoing emergency presumably does not exist when the defendant has left 
the scene and the alleged victim calls the police to report past events. Id. at 828 (suggesting that the 
emergency ends when the defendant drives “away from the premises”). Ignoring this aspect of Da-
vis, some courts have found an ongoing emergency to exist in cases where the suspect had long since 
left the premises. See, e.g., State v. Warsame, 723 N.W.2d 637, 641–42 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d 
in pertinent part, 735 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 2007). In Warsame, the court concluded that an ongoing 
emergency under Davis “need not be limited to the [911] complainant’s predicament or the location 
where she is questioned by the police.” Id. at 641. Instead, the court reasoned,  
As long as a possible emergency situation, occurring at another location or involving 
another person, is related to the complainant’s own situation and is one which can be cla-
rified by questioning her, the purpose of the questioning may be considered as for the 
primary purpose of enabling police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. 
Id. at 641–42. In State v. Camarena, 145 P.3d 267 (Or. Ct. App. 2006), the court applied the Davis 
totality-of-the-circumstances test and concluded that statements to a 911 operator that described an 
assault occurring about one minute earlier were nontestimonial. Although the declarant “did not call 
9-1-1 as the assault was taking place” and “was referring to ‘past’ events, the danger of a renewal of 
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In the wake of Davis, courts of different states often reached oppo-
site results on similar facts,70 causing the right of confrontation to vary 
by jurisdiction. Bryant—the Court’s most recent ruling on this issue—
significantly aggravates the problem. 
In Bryant, the Court addressed whether statements of a shooting 
victim, Anthony Covington, were testimonial or nontestimonial.71 In that 
case, Detroit police responded to a call reporting that a man had been 
shot.72 When police arrived, approximately twenty-five minutes after the 
shooting,73 they found Covington lying on the ground with a gunshot 
wound to his abdomen.74 
The police asked Covington “what had happened, who had shot 
him, and where the shooting had occurred”75—questions relating to past 
events and thus seemingly subject to confrontation under Davis.76 In re-
                                                                                                             
the domestic assault had not necessarily or fully abated” because the “[d]efendant had just left” and 
“he could easily have returned before the police could arrive.” Id. at 274–75. 
 69. See Cicchini, supra note 18, at 771–74 (describing cases in which post-Davis courts dis-
torted the primary-purpose test). 
 70. See infra Part III.A. Compare People v. Romero, 187 P.3d 56, 81 (Cal. 2008) (deeming 
nontestimonial an assault victim’s statements that described having been attacked by two men with a 
hammer-sized ax, when those statements occurred after the men had fled the scene and were subse-
quently found hiding in bushes down the street; reasoning that “[t]he statements pro-
vided . . . information necessary for [police] to assess and deal with the situation, including . . . eva-
luat[ing] potential threats to others and . . . apprehend[ing] the perpetrators,” and that they “were not 
made primarily for the purpose of producing evidence for a later trial”), with State v. Lewis, 235 
S.W.3d 136, 147 (Tenn. 2007) (deeming testimonial statements of a store owner who had just been 
robbed and shot in the chest that he “knew” that “the lady with the vases” was involved in the crime; 
reasoning that“[t]he assailant had left the store,” “[t]he 911 call had already been made” after the 
victim had spoken with a neighboring store owner, and “even though the victim was in a state of 
distress from his wounds, his comments did not describe an ‘ongoing emergency’ . . . and were 
instead descriptions of recent, but past, criminal activity”). 
 71. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1166. 
 74. Id. at 1150. 
 75. People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 71 (Mich. 2009), vacated and remanded by Bryant, 131 
S. Ct. 1143. 
 76. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); see also id. at 827 (distinguishing state-
ments “designed primarily to ‘establis[h] or prov[e]’ some past fact” and those meant “to describe 
current circumstances requiring police assistance”). In its assessment of the merits, the Davis Court 
further highlighted the distinction between past and present events. Id. In distinguishing the interro-
gation that had occurred in Davis (which led to nontestimonial statements) and the one in Crawford 
(which led to testimonial statements), the Court reasoned: (1) in Davis, the 911 caller “was speaking 
about events as they were actually happening, rather than ‘describ[ing] past events.’” Id. (quoting 
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999)). “Sylvia Crawford’s interrogation, on the other hand, 
took place hours after the events she described had occurred.” Id. (2) “[A]ny reasonable listener 
would recognize that McCottry (unlike Sylvia Crawford) was facing an ongoing emergency . . . . 
McCottry’s call was plainly a call for help against bona fide physical threat.” Id. (3) “[T]he [ques-
tions] asked and answered in Davis [objectively indicated] that the elicited statements were neces-
sary . . . to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford) what had 
happened in the past. That is true even of the operator’s effort to establish the identity of the assai-
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sponse, Covington stated that “Rick” (defendant Bryant) had shot him.77 
Further implicating Bryant, Covington revealed that he had spoken with 
Bryant through the back door of Bryant’s house and that Bryant had shot 
him when he turned to leave.78 Police then traveled to Bryant’s house, 
where they found evidence tending to confirm Covington’s story.79 
Covington died shortly after this exchange.80 At Bryant’s trial, the 
officers who spoke with Covington recounted Covington’s statements 
under oath.81 The jury then found Bryant guilty of second-degree murder 
and related charges,82 and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed.83 
After a series of appeals, the Supreme Court of Michigan re-
versed.84 Applying Davis, the court found that “the ‘primary purpose’ of 
the questioning was to establish the facts of an event that had already 
occurred[,] . . . not to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emer-
gency.”85 Because Covington described past events, the court felt that 
“his primary purpose in making these statements . . . was . . . to tell the 
police who had committed the crime,” information that would be used 
prosecutorially.86 Accordingly, the Michigan Supreme Court deemed the 
statements testimonial and held that Covington’s statements should have 
been excluded.87 
The United States Supreme Court reversed.88 Employing a broad 
view of ongoing emergency, one which “extends beyond an initial victim 
                                                                                                             
lant.” Id. And (4) “Crawford was responding calmly, at the station house, to a series of questions, 
with the officer-interrogator taping and making notes of her answers; McCottry’s frantic answers 
were provided over the phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or even . . . safe.” Id. 
 77. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. In particular, police found blood and a bullet on the back porch and an apparent bullet 
hole in the back door. Id. Police also discovered Covington’s wallet and identification outside the 
Bryant home. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL 1882661, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004) 
(per curiam). 
 84. People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Mich. 2009), vacated and remanded by Bryant, 131 
S. Ct. 1143. 
 85. Id. at 71. Applying the Davis distinctions, the Michigan Supreme Court deemed Coving-
ton’s statements testimonial. Id. According to the Michigan Supreme Court, “The circums-
tances . . . clearly indicate that the ‘primary purpose’ of the questioning was to establish the facts of 
an event that had already occurred; the ‘primary purpose’ was not to enable police assistance to meet 
an ongoing emergency.” Id. The court came to this conclusion because “[t]he crime had been com-
pleted about 30 minutes earlier and six blocks from where the police questioned the victim,” and 
because “[t]he police asked the victim what had happened in the past, not what was currently hap-
pening.” Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 75. 
 88. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1166–67 (2011). 
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to a potential threat to the responding police and the public at large,”89 an 
approach that vastly expands the category of nontestimonial hearsay,90 
the Bryant Court deemed Covington’s statements nontestimonial.91 
Along the way, the Bryant Court clarified how courts should distin-
guish testimonial from nontestimonial statements. The Court explained: 
(1) the primary-purpose test broadly governs the testimoni-
al/nontestimonial distinction, even in cases not involving an ongoing 
emergency;92 (2) when applying the primary-purpose test, courts must 
objectively evaluate93 two overarching variables, “[t]he circumstances in 
which the encounter occurs” and “[t]he statements and actions of [both] 
parties”;94 (3) under this analysis, an objective evaluation95 of whether an 
ongoing emergency exists at the time of the declarant’s statements is one 
of “the most important circumstances” to consider;96 and (4) courts 
                                                 
 89. Id. at 1156. 
 90. See Cicchini, supra note 18, at 779; see also Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1173 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the majority’s “distorted view [of the nature of an ongoing emergency] creates an 
expansive exception to the Confrontation Clause for violent crimes”). 
 91. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167. 
 92. Id. at 1155 (suggesting that the primary-purpose test will determine whether a statement is 
testimonial or nontestimonial, even in cases not involving ongoing emergencies); Philpot v. State, 
709 S.E.2d 831, 835 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (“Bryant . . . substantially alters and expands the frame-
work for analyzing whether an out-of-court statement being challenged on Confrontation Clause 
grounds is testimonial or nontestimonial . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also Richard D. Friedman, 
Statements Made in the Absence of Interrogation, CONFRONTATION BLOG (Mar. 28, 2011, 12:22 
PM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011_03_01_archive.html (“Bryant does appear to 
expand on Davis v. Washington by creating a general principle that ‘primary purpose’ is determina-
tive in all circumstances of whether a statement is testimonial.”). For an example of a recent case 
applying the primary-purpose test in the absence of an emergency, see State v. Bulger, Nos. 94665, 
94666, 94667, 2011 WL 3359861, at *3 n.5 (Ohio. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2011) (noting Bryant is “distin-
guishable because the instant case is not being viewed as an emergency to which police responded,” 
but deeming the objectionable hearsay statement nontestimonial under the primary purpose test). 
 93. According to the Court, the relevant inquiry focuses not on the actual purpose of the indi-
viduals involved “but rather the purpose that reasonable participants would have had” in such an 
encounter. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156. 
 94. Id. The Bryant court also noted that Davis uses the word “objective” or “objectively” at 
least eight times when describing the relevant inquiry. Id. (citation omitted). 
 95. As the Court explained in a footnote: 
The existence of an ongoing emergency must be objectively assessed from the perspec-
tive of the parties to the interrogation at the time, not with the benefit of hindsight. If the 
information the parties knew at the time of the encounter would lead a reasonable person 
to believe that there was an emergency, even if that belief was later proved incorrect, that 
is sufficient for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. The emergency is relevant to the 
“primary purpose of the interrogation” because of the effect it has on the parties’ purpose, 
not because of its actual existence. 
Id. at 1157 n.8. 
 96. Id. at 1162. According to the Bryant Court, “The existence of an ongoing emergency is 
relevant to determining the primary purpose of the interrogation because an emergency focuses the 
participants on something other than ‘proving past events potentially relevant to later criminal prose-
cution.’ Rather, it focuses them on ‘end[ing] a threatening situation.’” Id. at 1157 (quoting Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 832 (2006)). In a statement reminiscent of the “reliability” view of 
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should ultimately consider the entire context,97 including a variety of 
specific factors provided in the opinion.98 
As under Roberts, where courts often employed up to ten factors in 
a given case,99 Bryant noted a variety of factors courts should consider 
when determining the primary purpose of an out-of-court statement.100 
According to Bryant, courts are to consider the following factors relating 
to “the circumstances of [the] encounter”:101 (1) “the type of weapon em-
ployed” by any alleged assailant;102 (2) “the medical condition of a decla-
rant”;103 (3) the formality or informality of the encounter;104 (4) whether 
the encounter appears disorganized;105 and (5) the location of the encoun-
ter.106 In the overall analysis, courts must also consider the “statements 
and actions of the parties,”107 including more specific factors relating to 
(6) the declarant’s statements, particularly those regarding the nature of 
                                                                                                             
the confrontation right that existed under Roberts, the Court explained “that because the prospect of 
fabrication in statements given for the primary purpose of resolving that emergency is presumably 
significantly diminished, the Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be subject to 
the crucible of cross-examination.” Id. 
 97. Id. at 1158. 
 98. Id. at 1158–62. 
 99. In Crawford, for example, the Washington Court of Appeals applied a nine-factor reliabili-
ty test. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 41 (2004); see also Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 
43–44 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (summarizing Maryland law under Roberts as requiring a court to 
evaluate thirteen separate factors to determine whether an out-of-court hearsay statement bore “par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness” (citations omitted)). 
 100. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158–62. In dissent, Justice Scalia summarized the factors noted by 
the majority as including (1) “the type of weapon the defendant wielded”; (2) “the type of crime the 
defendant committed”; (3) “the medical condition of the declarant”; (4) “whether paramedics have 
arrived on the scene”; (5) “whether the encounter takes place in an ‘exposed public area’”; (6) 
“whether the encounter appears disorganized”; (7) “whether the declarant is capable of forming a 
purpose”; (8) “whether the police have secured the scene of the crime”; (9) “the formality of the 
statement”; and (10) “whether the statement strikes [the court] as reliable.” Id. at 1175–76 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 101. Id. at 1156 (majority opinion). 
 102. Id. at 1158 (noting that the nature and duration of an emergency might change depending 
on the particular weapon employed, and drawing a distinction between assailants who use their fists 
and assailants who employ guns). 
 103. Id. at 1159. As the Court explained, the severity of a declarant’s injuries may shed light on 
the declarant’s purpose, if any, and may enable first responders to judge the existence and magnitude 
of a continuing threat to the victim, themselves, and the public. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1160. As in Crawford, “formality suggests the absence of an emergency and there-
fore an increased likelihood that the purpose of the interrogation is to [generate testimonial evi-
dence].” Id. (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)). Informality, however, “does 
not necessarily indicate the presence of an emergency or the lack of testimonial intent.” Id. (citing 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 826). 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. at 1156. On this factor, the Court here noted a distinction between interrogation “at 
or near the scene of the crime versus at a police station.” Id. Presumably, a “formal station-house 
interrogation,” as in Crawford, id. at 1160, is more likely to render a statement testimonial in nature. 
 107. Id. at 1162. 
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the potential emergency;108 (7) the types of questions posed by the inter-
rogators;109 (8) whether a “reasonable victim in the circumstances of the 
actual victim” would envision prosecution, would instead be motivated 
by ending the threat from the assailant, both, or neither;110 (9) whether 
the parties might “have mixed motives” (which could require the court to 
determine which purpose was primary);111 (10) “[t]he identity of [the] 
interrogator”112 (a factor that becomes critical in cases involving ques-
tioning by medical personnel and potential police agents); and (11) a 
catch-all factor consisting of “all relevant information” bearing upon 
“whether a declarant’s statements are testimonial,”113 a mandate sure to 
lead to development of additional factors not identified in Bryant.114 
In analyzing the merits of Bryant’s case, the Court applied as many 
as six factors, including what the police knew when they arrived at the 
scene, the specific questions they asked, the particular information Co-
vington conveyed, the weapon involved, Covington’s medical condition, 
and the relative informality of the situation.115 Ultimately, the Court held 
that Covington’s statements were nontestimonial because their primary 
purpose was to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency,116 one that 
involved “a threat potentially to the police and the public.”117 As a result, 
the Confrontation Clause did not bar their admission.118 
                                                 
 108. Id. at 1159. As the Court explained, it is possible, for example, for “a declarant [to] pro-
vide[] police with information that makes clear that what appeared to be an emergency is not or is no 
longer an emergency or that what appeared to be a public threat is actually a private dispute,” there-
by presumably altering the “primary purpose” of the interrogation. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1161. According to the Court, “Davis requires a combined inquiry that accounts for 
both the declarant and the interrogator.” Id. at 1160. That inquiry includes examination of the words 
exchanged. Id. at 1160–61. When considering the statements of both parties, courts should examine 
“the contents of both the questions and the answers.” Id. at 1161. As an example, “if the police say 
to a victim, ‘Tell us who did this to you so that we can arrest and prosecute them,’ the victim’s re-
sponse that ‘Rick did it,’” would appear testimonial, as the conversation has a clear prosecutorial 
focus. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1161–62 (elaborating on these possibilities). 
 111. Id. at 1161. 
 112. Id. at 1162. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Just as they did under Davis, courts are sure to develop additional factors under Bryant. 
See, e.g., State v. Warsame, 735 N.W.2d 684, 695 (Minn. 2007) (finding it significant that the inter-
rogating officer did not take detailed notes while questioning the victim of a recent assault). 
 115. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1163–67. 
 116. Id. at 1163–64. 
 117. Id. at 1164. The Court declared, “At bottom, there was an ongoing emergency here where 
an armed shooter, whose motive for and location after the shooting were unknown, had mortally 
wounded Covington within a few blocks and a few minutes of the location where the police found 
Covington.” Id. 
 118. Id. at 1167. 
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Justice Thomas concurred in the result but wrote separately to high-
light the flaws in the primary-purpose test.119 Rather than attempt to di-
vine the unknowable primary purpose of each party, Justice Thomas fo-
cused on “the extent to which the interrogation resembles those historical 
practices that the Confrontation Clause addressed.”120 Emphasizing the 
lack of formality in the exchange between Covington and the police, Jus-
tice Thomas concluded—like the majority—that admission of Coving-
ton’s statements did not implicate the Confrontation Clause.121 
Justice Scalia, the author of Crawford, was one of only two dissen-
ters.122 Justice Scalia’s dissent both criticized the majority’s decision on 
the merits and bemoaned the opinion’s influence on Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence, which he described as “distort[ed]” and “in a 
shambles.”123 His dissent insightfully shows how a purpose-based 
framework can lead to inconsistent results and other undesirable out-
comes, such as an expansive violent crimes exception. 
Before addressing the merits of Bryant’s case, Justice Scalia 
scolded the majority for considering the interrogator’s intent.124 Accord-
ing to Scalia, “The inquiry under Crawford turns in part on the actions 
and statements of a declarant’s audience only because they shape the 
declarant’s perception of why his audience is listening and therefore in-
fluence his purpose in making the declaration.”125 As Scalia rightly 
noted, only an approach that focuses on the declarant’s intent “would 
work in every fact pattern implicating the Confrontation Clause”126 be-
cause not all hearsay statements are made in response to actual interroga-
tion.127 Further, examining the purposes of both the declarant and the 
                                                 
 119. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I have criticized the primary-purpose test as ‘an exercise in 
fiction’ that is ‘disconnected from history’ and ‘yields no predictable results.’ Rather than attempting 
to reconstruct the ‘primary purpose’ of the participants, I would consider the extent to which the 
interrogation resembles those historical practices that the Confrontation Clause addressed.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1167–68. 
 122. Id. at 1168–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. at 1168. 
 124. Id. at 1168–69. 
 125. Id. at 1169. 
 126. Id. As Justice Scalia argues, “An inquiry into an officer’s purposes would make no sense 
when a declarant blurts out ‘Rick shot me’ as soon as the officer arrives on the scene. I see no reason 
to adopt a different test—one that accounts for an officer’s intent—when the officer asks ‘what 
happened’ before the declarant makes his accusation.” Id. 
 127. Id. (“The [Confrontation] Clause applies to volunteered testimony as well as statements 
solicited through police interrogation.” (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 n.1 (2006))); 
see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009) (deeming testimonial state-
ments contained in a certificate “reporting the results of forensic analysis which showed that material 
seized by the police and connected to the defendant was cocaine” even though statements were not 
made in response to interrogation). 
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interrogator “only compounds the problem,” as “[n]ow courts [might] 
have to sort through two sets of mixed motives.”128 
Justice Scalia also noted the ease with which the majority’s stan-
dards could be manipulated to reach desired outcomes and argued the 
following: 
If the dastardly police trick a declarant into giving an incriminating 
statement against a sympathetic defendant, a court can focus on the 
police’s intent and declare the statement testimonial. If the defen-
dant “deserves” to go to jail, then a court can focus on whatever 
perspective is necessary to declare damning hearsay nontestimonial. 
And when all else fails, a court can mix-and-match perspectives to 
reach its desired outcome. Unfortunately, under this malleable ap-
proach “the guarantee of confrontation is no guarantee at all.”129 
After noting other troubling aspects of the majority’s framework,130 
Justice Scalia addressed the merits of Bryant’s case, which he called “an 
absurdly easy” one.131 Focusing on the intent of the declarant,132 Scalia 
argued that from Covington’s perspective, “his statements had little value 
except to ensure the arrest and eventual prosecution of Richard 
                                                 
 128. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. (quoting Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 375 (2008)). 
 130. Justice Scalia also worried that one passage in the majority opinion might resurrect the 
very concepts of “reliability” rejected in Crawford. Id. at 1174–76. As the majority described the 
governing analysis, other circumstances “aside from ongoing emergencies” might exist where “a 
statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial tes-
timony”; in those situations, the majority wrote, “standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify 
some statements as reliable, will be relevant.” Id. at 1155 (majority opinion). As Justice Scalia inter-
preted this passage, “The Court announces . . . it will look to ‘standard rules of hearsay, designed to 
identify some statements as reliable,’ when deciding whether a statement is testimonial.” Id. at 1174 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Yet, this was the very aspect of the Roberts test that was overruled in Craw-
ford. Id. While this particular aspect of Justice Scalia’s critique is likely overstated, in that the major-
ity’s reference to “reliability” was made in regards to the Crawford framework and its testimoni-
al/nontestimonial distinction, see id. at 1155 (majority opinion), time will tell whether lower courts 
incorporate notions of reliability back into confrontation analysis. There is already some indication 
that courts will do so. See, e.g., Philpot v. State, 709 S.E.2d 831, 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (“The new 
analytical framework for assessing whether an out-of-court statement implicates the Confrontation 
Clause [as clarified in Bryant] is still one that seeks to discern the primary purpose behind that 
statement, but which also recognizes that ‘standard rules of hearsay,’ and their respective indicia of 
reliability, are relevant to a court’s primary-purpose inquiry.” (citation omitted)); State v. Bulger, 
Nos. 94665, 94666, 94667, 2011 WL 3359861, at *4 (Ohio. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2011) (Gallagher, J., 
concurring) (“Appellant’s counsel is concerned that this case will stand for the proposition that the 
‘reliability’ of so-called nontestimonial statements will begin to rule the day over the preferred stan-
dard of ‘confrontation’ outlined under Crawford. It is a legitimate concern, but one not likely to be 
resolved by an intermediate appellate court.”). 
 131. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 132. In Part I.C. of his opinion, Justice Scalia argued that “this is an absurdly easy case even if 
one (erroneously) takes the interrogating officers’ purpose into account.” Id. at 1171. 
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Bryant.”133 When Covington made his statements, Covington knew his 
encounter with Bryant had ended twenty-five minutes earlier and that 
even if Bryant had pursued him, which was unlikely, it was entirely im-
plausible that Bryant would again confront Covington while surrounded 
by five armed police officers.134 Moreover, because Covington knew 
Bryant was “not a spree killer who might randomly threaten others,” he 
had no reason to believe an ongoing emergency existed.135 
Drawing an opposite inference from Covington’s dire medical con-
dition (and illustrating the malleability of the majority’s multifactor test), 
Justice Scalia further argued that “Covington’s pressing medical needs 
do not suggest that he was responding to an emergency, but to the con-
trary reinforce the testimonial character of his statements.”136 According 
to Justice Scalia, Covington “understood the police were focused on in-
vestigating a past crime, not his medical needs,” as the officers did not 
meaningfully “attempt to assess the severity of his wounds.”137 
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that Covington’s statements, and in-
deed the entire colloquy, “would have been a routine direct examination” 
at trial.138 Like a witness, Covington recounted the details of a past crim-
inal event, and like a prosecutor, the police elicited those details through 
structured questioning.139 According to Scalia, “Preventing the admission 
of ‘weaker substitutes for live testimony at trial’ such as this . . . is pre-
cisely what motivated the Framers to adopt the Confrontation Clause and 
what motivated our decision[] in Crawford.”140 
Addressing the broader impact of the decision, Justice Scalia wor-
ried that the majority’s “distorted view [of the concept of an ongoing 
emergency] creates an expansive exception to the Confrontation Clause 
for violent crimes.”141 As Scalia argued, if prosecutors can plausibly 
claim that a potential threat to the police or the public persisted through 
the first few hours after a violent act, as they did in Bryant, then defen-
dants will effectively lose the right to cross-examine all such wit-
nesses.142 This in turn creates a potentially vast expansion of the category 
                                                 
 133. Id. at 1170. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1171. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. (citation omitted). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (citation omitted). 
 141. Id. at 1173. 
 142. Id.; see also People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Mich. 2009) (“The prosecutor argues 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable police assistance to meet an ‘ongoing 
emergency’—to find and apprehend a criminal before he injured somebody else. This argument is 
unpersuasive because an ‘ongoing emergency’ in this sense would almost always exist while the 
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of nontestimonial hearsay and threatens to make the right of confronta-
tion “a hollow constitutional guarantee.”143 
III. EVADING CONFRONTATION THROUGH THE 
TESTIMONIAL/NONTESTIMONIAL DISTINCTION 
Bryant’s framework, which requires consideration of countless fac-
tors, is strikingly reminiscent of the discredited Roberts framework. Like 
the Roberts test, the Bryant test makes case results unpredictable144 and 
provides easy means for courts to dispense with actual confrontation. 
A. Manipulating the Bryant Factors Test 
The lack of predictable results under the Bryant test is reflected in 
lower court rulings applying the Bryant framework. People v. Clay,145 for 
example, illustrates how slight changes in an interrogator’s questions can 
alter the outcome, allowing for easy evasion of the confrontation right. 
In Clay, New York’s intermediate appellate court admitted state-
ments of shooting victim, Igol Isaacs, which identified Thomas Clay as 
the shooter.146 Shortly after Isaacs was shot,147 Police Captain Brian 
McGee responded to the call, where he discovered several officers sur-
rounding Isaacs, who was lying face-up on a public sidewalk.148 Without 
speaking with the other officers, “McGee knelt down beside [Isaacs] and 
asked ‘Who shot you?’”149 “Receiving no response, McGee then stated to 
Isaacs: ‘I don’t think you’re going to make it. Who shot you?’”150 
                                                                                                             
police are investigating alleged crimes. That is, to adopt the prosecutor’s argument would effectively 
render non-testimonial all statements made before the offender was placed behind bars. This is clear-
ly inconsistent with the commands of the Supreme Court.” (citations omitted)), vacated and re-
manded by Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143. 
 143. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1173 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Cicchini, supra note 18, at 770 
(“If situations can be upgraded to ongoing emergencies simply because a defendant might commit an 
unspecified crime at some unspecified time in the future against an unspecified victim, then every 
situation will be automatically transformed into an ongoing emergency. In that case . . . no statement 
could ever be classified as testimonial.”). 
 144. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 145. People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598 (App. Div. 2011). 
 146. Id. at 607–11 (holding that the declarant’s statement identifying his assailant was testi-
monial, but admitting the statement as a dying declaration, which the court recognized as an excep-
tion to the Confrontation Clause). 
 147. According to the court, “Isaacs was shot six times. Three of the bullets entered Isaacs’s 
abdomen, the right side of his back, and the left side of his back, . . . fractured two vertebrae and the 
spinal cord, and passed into his chest cavity, perforating [his right lung].” Id. at 610. At the time 
Isaacs identified his shooter, he struggled to breathe and was informed by McGee that he would 
probably not live. Id. Under these circumstances, the court admitted Isaacs’s statement, “Tom shot 
me,” as a dying declaration. Id. at 611. 
 148. Id. at 600. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
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Isaacs then apparently responded, “Todd shot me.”151 “When 
McGee sought to confirm ‘Todd shot you,’ the victim stated, ‘[N]o. No. 
Tom shot me. Tom. Tom.’”152 McGee then asked, “Tom who?”153 At that 
point, Isaacs became unable to speak and died shortly thereafter.154 
Clay was subsequently tried for second-degree murder.155 At trial, 
McGee testified and described the incriminatory statements made by 
Isaacs.156 Clay was convicted on the strength of this and other evi-
dence.157 
On appeal, Clay argued that McGee’s testimony violated his right 
to confront Isaacs.158 The appellate court agreed that Isaacs’s statements 
were testimonial but admitted the statements under the dying-
declarations exception.159 In summarizing Bryant,160 the court empha-
sized Bryant’s totality-of-the-circumstances approach, describing the 
Bryant inquiry as “a fact-based question that must necessarily be ans-
wered on a case-by-case basis.”161 
On the merits, the court found significant factual distinctions be-
tween Clay’s case and Bryant’s.162 Unlike the questioner in Bryant, 
McGee was not the first officer on the scene.163 Thus, the court specu-
lated, “It stands to reason that the other officers would have already en-
deavored to determine the nature of any emergency that may have ex-
isted . . . .”164 Moreover, unlike the responding officer in Bryant, whose 
initial question to the victim was a “general inquiry as to what had hap-
pened,” McGee’s initial question was, “Who shot you?”165 McGee’s 
question was therefore “designed only to learn the identity of the perpe-
trator.”166 According to the court, while efforts were also made to estab-
lish the identity of the assailant in Bryant, “such questions were merely 
                                                 
 151. Id. at 600–01. 
 152. Id. at 601. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 600. 
 155. Id. at 601. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. On the night of the shooting, Yvette Clay, who claimed to have witnessed the shoot-
ing, identified the killers as her estranged husband Thomas Clay and another man, Sidor Fletcher. Id. 
In addition to McGee’s testimony, the prosecution presented the testimony of Yvette Clay, along 
with the testimony of another eyewitness who had been talking to Isaacs when the shooting oc-
curred. Id. Each of these witnesses identified Clay as one of two shooters. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 607–11. 
 160. Id. at 604–05. 
 161. Id. at 605 (quoting People v. Nieves-Andino, 872 N.E.2d 1188, 1190 (N.Y. 2007)). 
 162. Id. at 605–07. 
 163. Id. at 605. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 606. 
 166. Id. (citation omitted). 
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part of a general battery of questions” aimed at “‘assess[ing] the situa-
tion’ and the potential threat to public safety.”167 In Clay, however, 
“[McGee’s] ‘evident reason’ for asking ‘who shot you’ was not ‘to deal 
with an emergency’ but to give Isaacs what might have been . . . his final 
opportunity to bear witness against his assailants.”168 Thus, unlike in 
Bryant, the court found the statements in Clay testimonial, which would 
have made the statements inadmissible had the court not invoked a con-
frontation exception.169 
While the court’s logic is sound, it ignores the striking similarities 
between Bryant and Clay. In both cases, police responded to the call of a 
man who was recently shot. In both cases, police discovered the man in 
dire medical condition lying in public. In both cases, the shooting victim 
died shortly after speaking with the police. Yet, the Clay court distin-
guished Bryant based on the nature of the questions asked and ignored 
other factors highlighted in Bryant. For example, the Clay court down-
played the informality of the encounter between McGee and Isaacs by 
relegating it to a footnote,170 a factor the Bryant Court found significant 
in a factually similar scenario.171 
The ability to distinguish Bryant based simply on the wording of 
the questions asked172 shows how very slight differences in an interroga-
tor’s wording can change the Sixth Amendment outcome. Presumably, 
had Officer McGee simply asked Isaacs “a general battery of questions,” 
even ones aimed at discovering the assailant’s identity, as in Bryant, 
Isaacs’s response would become magically nontestimonial. By the same 
token, the Clay court would presumably reach the opposite result as 
Bryant in a case identical to Bryant if the interrogating officer simply 
added, “I don’t think you are going to make it.” Phrasing questions diffe-
                                                 
 167. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1166 (2011)). 
 168. Id. (quoting People v. Bradley, 862 N.E.2d 79, 79 (N.Y. 2006)) The court also empha-
sized that “upon learning the identity of the shooter, McGee next set out to ‘preserve the crime 
scene.’ McGee [later] explained that the purpose of this activity was to locate and secure evidence, 
and to locate any witnesses to the crime.” Id. 
 169. Id. at 607. 
 170. Id. at 604 n.1 (“Another relevant circumstance identified by the [Bryant] Court was the 
formality or informality of the encounter. However, the Court acknowledged that ‘informality does 
not necessarily indicate . . . the lack of testimonial intent’ and recognized that the right to confronta-
tion cannot be evaded by deliberately keeping an interrogation informal.” (quoting Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1160)). 
 171. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160. 
 172. On this point, the Clay court reasoned, 
[T]he inquiry “Who shot you? I don’t think you are going to make it. Who shot you?” is 
closer to “‘Tell us who did this to you so that we can arrest and prosecute them,’” than it 
is to a general inquiry beginning with “what happened?” In other words, “the victim’s re-
sponse . . . appears purely accusatory . . . by virtue of the phrasing of the question.” 
Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 606 (citation omitted). 
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rently, such as “What happened?” rather than “Who shot you?” or posing 
questions about the identity of the assailant within “a general battery of 
questions” is an incredibly easy distinction to manipulate. The Constitu-
tion should not turn on these trivialities. 
Courts have reached the opposite outcome in cases involving inter-
rogations nearly identical to Clay. For example, in State v. Calhoun,173 a 
pre-Bryant case, the court deemed nontestimonial the statements of a 
shooting victim identifying his assailant.174 As in Clay, the declarant in 
Calhoun was found motionless after he was shot, and the interrogator 
asked just one question: Who shot him?175 In response, the declarant 
stated it was “Chico” and “Worm.”176 The declarant was then asked to 
“squeeze [the interrogator’s] hand to confirm that ‘Chico’ and ‘Worm’ 
were the shooters, and [the declarant] did so.”177 While this was the ex-
tent of the interrogation, the court found the statements nontestimonial.178 
Presumably, the Clay court would have disagreed, as the officer’s sole 
question in Clay, “Who shot you?” was nearly identical to the sole ques-
tion in Calhoun.179 
As Clay and Calhoun reveal, a declarant’s primary purpose in de-
scribing one’s assailant is often difficult to determine. This difficulty has 
led to inconsistent rulings in additional similar cases. In Davis, for ex-
ample, the Court analyzed the 911 dispatcher’s questions and concluded 
that the identity of the assailant was necessary to attend to an ongoing 
emergency “so that the dispatched officers might know whether they 
would be encountering a violent felon.”180 Likewise, in Harkins v. 
State,181 the court found that a shooting victim’s statement made to a 911 
operator was testimonial when he identified his assailant by declaring, 
“Jerry shot me and he was paid to do it.”182 Echoing Davis, the court rea-
soned that “[a]lthough the assailant’s name was not likely necessary to 
assist [the declarant] medically, that information could be used by police 
to prevent further harm.”183 
                                                 
 173. State v. Calhoun, 657 S.E.2d 424 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
 174. Id. at 425. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 427. 
 179. Id. (“Among the acceptable purposes of the interrogation is to ‘establish the identity of the 
assailant, so that the dispatched officers might know whether they would be encountering a violent 
felon.’ There being such an emergency here, we hold that [the shooting victim’s] statements were 
non-testimonial on this ground as well.” (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006))). 
 180. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 (citation omitted). 
 181. Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706 (Nev. 2006). 
 182. Id. at 709. 
 183. Id. at 715. The court believed that 
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In State v. Jones, the Kansas Supreme Court reached the opposite 
result when considering similar statements of a shooting victim who 
identified his assailant, and characterized the nature of the emergency in 
a way that contradicted Harkins and Davis. In Jones, the court held that a 
shooting victim’s statements identifying his assailant were testimonial 
when they were made to paramedics during transit to a hospital.184 Ac-
cording to the court, “Although [the victim] was in the midst of a medi-
cal emergency, the paramedics’ questions . . . were not designed to deal 
with the immediate danger. Rather, the questions about the identity of the 
shooter related to past events and sought information above and beyond 
what was necessary to administer medical care.”185 As a result, the court 
deemed the declarant’s statements identifying his assailant testimonial.186 
The courts in both Jones and Harkins agreed that information re-
garding the assailant was not needed to assist the declarant medically, but 
the courts reached opposite outcomes on similar facts. In its primary-
purpose analysis, Jones focused on the medical emergency of the decla-
rant, whereas Harkins ignored that aspect of the case and focused instead 
on the potential threat posed by the assailant to others. 
As this comparison reveals, sometimes details regarding an assai-
lant’s identity are necessary to assess the nature of a potential ongoing 
emergency, but sometimes they are not. When courts are required to spe-
culate whether such details were truly necessary to resolve an ongoing 
emergency, courts are bound to create inconsistent outcomes and 
hairsplitting distinctions. 
Graure v. United States,187 a case from the District of Columbia, 
further illustrates the malleability of the Bryant test. In that case, defen-
dant Vasile Graure was prosecuted for having set fire to a strip club. 
Club employee Vladimir Djordjevic, the out-of-court declarant, con-
fronted Graure as he entered the club carrying gasoline and a lighter. As 
the two struggled, Graure was able to pour and ignite the gasoline, and 
Djordjevic was “completely covered in flames.”188 
                                                                                                             
[s]imilarly, the information that “he was paid to do it” was not relevant in assisting [the 
declarant] medically, but that information could also be used by police to determine the 
extent of the danger at the scene, i.e., the seriousness of [the assailant’s] intent to kill [the 
declarant] and whether he might return to the scene to ensure the job was completed. 
Id. Moreover, the court found it significant that “Deriso made that portion of the statement sponta-
neously, not in response to the dispatcher’s question.” Id. 
 184. State v. Jones, 197 P.3d 815, 820 (Kan. 2008). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. Moreover, “the fire department paramedic acknowledged that the information obtained 
through their questioning often helps the police where the patient has been transported from the 
scene quickly,” and the police had not yet had an opportunity to interrogate him. Id. 
 187. Graure v. United States, 18 A.3d 743 (D.C. 2011). 
 188. Id. at 751 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Minutes later, club manager Kathleen Lazorchack saw Djordjevic 
emerge from the building. According to Lazorchack, Djordjevic was 
“[c]harred from [] head to toe.”189 Indicating a concern for his own wel-
fare, rather than some hypothetical desire to address an ongoing emer-
gency, Djordjevic told Lazorchack not to touch him.190 At this point, La-
zorchack asked, “How did this happen?”191 Djordjevic responded, “I saw 
that man coming back with a can and I tried to stop him.”192 Another 
club employee, Ali Talebnejad, then asked Djordjevic, “What hap-
pened?”193 Djordjevic explained that “the guy came back to the club and 
tried to burn it,” and that Djordjevic had tried to stop him.194 Witnesses 
later described Djordjevic as “very frantic” and “in shock.”195 
Djordjevic was still in the hospital at the time of Graure’s trial,196 
and the trial court introduced the statements Djordjevic made after exit-
ing the club.197 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed.198 
Analyzing Graure’s Sixth Amendment claim, the court focused on “the 
primary purpose of the interrogation.”199 After summarizing Bryant and 
noting three Bryant factors—those relating to the weapon employed, the 
victim’s medical condition, and the informality of the situation200—the 
court stated that “all of the factors . . . identified in Bryant support a con-
clusion that [the] statements were not testimonial.”201 Emphasizing the 
three Bryant factors it had highlighted, the court reasoned: 
[W]hat had injured the visibly burned Djordjevic was fire, a weapon 
that could have continued to pose a threat to those in or near the 
club. Further, witnesses described the scene as one of confusion and 
bewilderment; thus, the situation did not involve formal or struc-
tured questioning. Finally, Djordjevic’s medical condition obvious-
ly was grave, making it likely that Talebnejad’s and Lazorchack’s 
questions would not have “focused him on the possible future pro-
                                                 
 189. Id. at 752. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 751–52. 
 195. Id. at 755. 
 196. Id. at 752. Djordjevic eventually died from his injuries. Id. 
 197. See id. at 754–55. 
 198. Id. at 755. 
 199. Id. at 756–57. 
 200. Id. at 757. 
 201. Id. 
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secutorial use of his statements,” and that his answers to their ques-
tions about what happened were “simply reflexive.”202 
While the court’s ruling is plausible, Djordjevic likely had no pur-
pose whatsoever in answering the simple questions posed by his supe-
riors. Djordjevic was “in shock” at the time203 and seemed to be focused 
on caring for his wounds rather than the danger posed by the defendant. 
Indeed, it seems that Djordjevic, who acted bravely in attempting to stop 
the defendant from entering the club, had shifted his focus away from the 
defendant and toward his own wounds, as would be expected under the 
circumstances. 
One could also question whether Djordjevic’s interrogators had any 
purpose other than to simply understand what happened. Talebnejad 
went home about ten minutes after Graure was kicked out of the club and 
returned to the club after he received a phone call about the fire.204 
Moreover, Talebnejad testified that he asked Djordjevic, “What hap-
pened?” simply because he “just wanted to know what happened.”205 It 
would be natural for Talebnejad, a manager at the club who did not wit-
ness the event,206 to simply wish to know what occurred. Like a commu-
ter who drives past the scene of an accident, the simple desire to under-
stand what caused the accident is neither a purpose directed toward fu-
ture prosecution nor one intended to address an ongoing emergency. It is 
possible—perhaps even likely—that the interrogators here were neither 
attempting to assess an emergency nor attempting to gather testimony for 
later prosecution. 
Bryant, Clay, and Graure each involve statements of a crime victim 
made within minutes of the criminal event. The victim’s statements in 
each case were made in direct response to preliminary investigative ques-
tions. In all three cases, the court speculated as to the likely purpose of a 
“reasonable victim in the circumstances of the actual victim.”207 In all 
three cases, it is possible that a similarly situated declarant would envi-
sion prosecution, would be motivated by ending the threat from the assai-
                                                 
 202. Id. at 757–58 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1166, 1161 (2006)). The 
court also deemed it significant, but not dispositive, that “[t]he questioners were not police officers 
but . . . acquaintances of Djordjevic.” Id. at 757. According to the court, because the questioners 
“had not been in a position to witness the [struggle], . . . neither questioner knew what had caused 
the fire or whether whatever or (whoever) had caused the fire continued to pose a risk to workers and 
patrons or to the club premises.” Id. at 757. 
 203. Id. at 755. 
 204. Id. at 752 n.7. 
 205. Id. at 758 n.18. 
 206. See id. at 757 (identifying Talebnejad as the club’s general manager and Lazorchack as a 
club manager). 
 207. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1161; see also Graure, 18 A.3d at 757; People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 
598, 606 (App. Div. 2011). 
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lant, would have multiple motivations, or would even have no motivation 
at all. 
Faced with the same type of generalized questions deemed signifi-
cant in Bryant and highlighted in Clay, the Graure court could have in-
voked the nature of the questions posed to support its ruling, but it did 
not. Rather, the Graure court emphasized only three of the Bryant fac-
tors—the weapon employed, the victim’s medical condition, and the in-
formality of the situation—while ignoring several others but stating that 
“all of the factors . . . identified in Bryant support a conclusion that 
Djordjevic’s statements were not testimonial.”208 This analytical method, 
where the court chooses which factors are relevant in any given case, 
permits a court to reach whatever result it desires. 
The possibility of judicial manipulation under the Bryant frame-
work is further illustrated by a comparison of how Bryant, Clay, and 
Graure treated the dire medical condition of each respective declarant. 
When analyzing this factor, the Bryant majority said, “[W]e cannot say 
that a person in Covington’s situation would have had a ‘primary pur-
pose’ ‘to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later crim-
inal prosecution.’”209 The Graure court felt the same, reasoning that the 
declarant’s “medical condition obviously was grave, making it likely that 
[the] questions would not have ‘focused him on the possible future pro-
secutorial use of his statements.’”210 The Clay court drew the opposite 
inference from nearly identical facts. According to Clay, when a decla-
rant’s medical condition is grave, the declarant might instead believe that 
the situation presents “his final opportunity to bear witness against his 
assailants,” thereby making his statement testimonial.211 Justice Scalia 
made a similar argument in his Bryant dissent.212 Either inference is rea-
sonable. 
                                                 
 208. Graure, 18 A.3d at 757 (emphasis added). 
 209. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)) 
(“When he made the statements, Covington was lying in a gas station parking lot bleeding from a 
mortal gunshot wound to his abdomen . . . . He was obviously in considerable pain and had difficulty 
breathing and talking . . . . [W]e cannot say that a person in Covington’s situation would have had a 
‘primary purpose’ ‘to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecu-
tion.’” (citations omitted)). 
 210. Graure, 18 A.3d at 758 (quoting Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1166); see also Commonwealth v. 
Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d 299, 310 (Mass. 2008) (“[T]he gravity of [the declarant-stabbing victim’s] phys-
ical injuries, and the immediate threat posed by those injuries, would likely preclude a reasonable 
person in her position from anticipating any nonimmediate future event, including a police investiga-
tion or a prosecution of the perpetrator.”). 
 211. People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598, 606 (App. Div. 2011). 
 212. In Bryant, Justice Scalia argued that “Covington’s pressing medical needs do not suggest 
that he was responding to an emergency, but to the contrary reinforce the testimonial character of his 
statements.” Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1171 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, Coving-
ton “understood the police were focused on investigating a past crime, not his medical needs”; in-
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As this comparison reveals, a test that hinges on the hidden and 
empirically unknowable primary purposes of hypothetical similarly si-
tuated declarants and interrogators, and which takes a variety of factors 
into account in making this determination, is no better than one that re-
quires a judge to determine a statement’s “reliability.” Crawford was 
intended to eliminate the malleability of the Roberts totality-of-the-
circumstances approach, yet Bryant revives that very approach. Replac-
ing a totality-of-the-circumstances test with another totality-of-the-
circumstances test threatens to entirely undermine Crawford’s aims. 
B. Multiple Concurrent Purposes 
The Bryant framework can be further manipulated through two un-
resolved issues. These issues, often related, include whether the Clause 
applies at all to statements made to nonstate actors, and how to categor-
ize cases of multiple concurrent purposes. Either issue presents an addi-
tional means of evading the confrontation right. 
This section addresses the inability of the primary-purpose test to 
account for multiple concurrent purposes, an issue that divided the 
Bryant Court. In that case, the majority rightly noted that people, espe-
cially the police and victims of violent crimes, often act with more than 
one purpose.213 Moreover, it would be rare for persons involved in such a 
volatile situation to clearly announce their intent before speaking.214 
                                                                                                             
deed, the officers did not attempt to assess more than superficially the severity of his wounds, but 
they focused instead on details relating to the past crime. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1161 (majority opinion) (conceding that “[p]olice officers in our society function as 
both first responders and criminal investigators,” which “may mean that they act with different mo-
tives simultaneously or in quick succession”); see also id. (“Victims are also likely to have mixed 
motives when they make statements to the police. During an ongoing emergency, a victim is most 
likely to want the threat to her and to other potential victims to end, but that does not necessarily 
mean that the victim wants or envisions prosecution of the assailant. A victim may want the attacker 
to be incapacitated temporarily or rehabilitated. Alternatively, a severely injured victim may have no 
purpose at all in answering questions posed; the answers may be simply reflexive.”); Davis, 547 U.S. 
at 839 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“In many, if not most, 
cases where police respond to a report of a crime, . . . the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from 
the perspective of the police, are both to respond to the emergency situation and to gather evi-
dence.”). 
 214. In the context of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing arguments, courts have recognized that people 
often commit acts with multiple motives. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia rejected the defendant’s argument that the would-be witness was killed in retal-
iation for his involvement with the police, rather than to silence him in the event of a future trial. 
United States v. Martinez, 476 F.3d 961, 966 (D.C. Cir. 2007). According to the court, the defen-
dant’s “argument is based on a false either-or dichotomy”; “intending both to exact revenge and to 
prevent the informant from disclosing further information and testifying” are purposes that “often go 
hand-in-glove.” Id. at 966; see also United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 654 (2d Cir. 2001); Vas-
quez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1104–05 (Colo. 2007) (en banc) (holding that preventing the wit-
ness’s testimony does not have to be the defendant’s sole motivation but need only be one reason for 
the defendant’s actions); State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699, 704–05 (N.M. 2004) (“The State need 
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Thus, a test that asks a court to divine the primary purpose of a hypothet-
ical similarly situated declarant or interrogator from among potentially 
several unstated purposes is nothing but “an exercise in fiction.”215 
Bryant and Clay are again illustrative. When seeking to uncover the 
primary purpose of the respective interrogators, the Bryant Court be-
lieved that “[t]he questions they asked—what had happened, who had 
shot him, and where the shooting occurred—were the exact type of ques-
tions necessary to allow the police to assess the situation.”216 Clay, on the 
other hand, distinguished Bryant despite strong similarities in the overall 
factual scenarios, reasoning that the officer’s “‘evident reason’ for asking 
‘who shot you’ was not ‘to deal with an emergency’ but to give [the dec-
larant] what might have been . . . his final opportunity to bear witness 
against his assailants.”217 Despite the very real possibility of multiple 
concurrent purposes, the Bryant majority confidently concluded that the 
responding officers’ sole purpose was to assess the alleged ongoing 
emergency that existed at the time,218 even in the absence of any direct 
evidence of that intent. But this is just one-half of the equation, as Bryant 
also requires courts to consider the declarant’s purpose, an approach that 
promises to compound the analytical difficulty.219 
Other courts that applied the primary-purpose test have struggled to 
determine what multiple purposes should be deemed primary. In State v. 
S.P.,220 the Oregon Supreme Court considered the admissibility of out-of-
court statements made with both prosecutorial and medical purposes.221 
S.P. involved hearsay statements a three-year-old sexual abuse victim, 
                                                                                                             
not . . . show that [Defendant’s] sole motivation was to procure the declarant’s absence; rather, it 
need only show that the defendant was motivated in part by a desire to silence the witness.” (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 215. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 839 (Tho-
mas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 
1161 (“The victim’s injuries could be so debilitating as to prevent her from thinking sufficiently 
clearly to understand whether her statements are for the purpose of addressing an ongoing emergen-
cy or for the purpose of future prosecution.”). See generally Michael L. Birzer & Gwynne Harris 
Birzer, Race Matters: A Critical Look at Racial Profiling, It’s a Matter for the Courts, 34 J. CRIM. 
JUST. 643, 650 (2006) (“While it is true that in a general sense, a person often intends the conse-
quences of his/her actions, it is virtually impossible to determine by any objectivity what a person is 
thinking inside of his/her head.”), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S004 
7235206000936. 
 216. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165–66 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 217. People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598, 606 (App. Div. 2011) (citation omitted). 
 218. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165–66. 
 219. See id. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Now courts will have to sort through two sets of 
mixed motives to determine the primary purpose of an interrogation”; “[Bryant] creates a mixed-
motive problem where . . . the police and the declarant each have one motive, but those motives 
conflict.”). 
 220. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. S.P., 215 P.3d 847 (Or. 2009) (en banc). 
 221. Id. at 864. 
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N., made to staff members at a local Child Abuse and Response Service 
(CARES) location.222 The CARES evaluation team consisted of a pedia-
trician, a social worker, two Department of Human Services workers, 
and a sheriff’s deputy.223 As the deputy observed the evaluation through 
a one-way mirror, a social worker elicited information from N. that im-
plicated defendant youth in various crimes.224 
At youth’s trial, the juvenile court ruled that most of N.’s state-
ments were nontestimonial.225 The court of appeals reversed, finding all 
of N.’s statements testimonial.226 The appeals court held that the CARES 
interview served two primary purposes: to obtain information for a medi-
cal diagnosis and to preserve evidence for prosecution.227 
The en banc Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.228 Like the lower 
court, the Oregon Supreme Court viewed the case as one involving the 
“concurrent and coequal” primary purposes of medical diagnosis and 
preservation of criminal evidence.229 As a result, the court resolved the 
case by examining “whether the declarant’s statements were the equiva-
lent of ‘testimony,’” the court’s view of the ultimate inquiry under Da-
vis.230 Under that standard, the court deemed N.’s statements testimonial. 
According to the court, “[W]itnesses do go into court to describe past 
sexual misconduct, and that is exactly what N. did at CARES.”231 
                                                 
 222. Id. at 849. The case began when victim, N., reported to his parents that the defendant, 
youth, had sexually abused him. Id. After youth and N. had been alone together in a bedroom, N. 
stated to his parents, “I don’t want to bite [youth’s] penis.” Id. N.’s parents asked N. to repeat what 
he had said, and N repeated the allegation. Id. N. also stated that youth had touched his penis. Id. 
This conversation eventually led to an evaluation with CARES. Id. 
 223. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. S.P., 178 P.3d 318, 329 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). 
 224. S.P., 215 P.3d at 850. Subsequently, detectives interviewed youth, confronting him with a 
copy of the CARES evaluation report. Id. Youth eventually admitted to touching N. inappropriately. 
Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. S.P., 178 P.3d at 331–32. 
 227. Id. at 329–30. This ruling effectively rejected the State’s argument that there was a “mi-
nimal degree of police involvement here.” Id. at 327–28. Rather, as the State argued, the primary 
purpose of the interview was “medical, not . . . prosecutorial” because a careful medical professional 
would have asked the same questions of N. and, presumably, have elicited the same responses even 
if the deputy had not been present. Id. at 327–28. The court disagreed. In the court’s view, “CARES 
also functions as an informational clearinghouse for police and child welfare authorities, so that they 
can deal effectively with perpetrators of child sex abuse.” Id. at 330. 
 228. See S.P., 215 P.3d at 864–66. 
 229. Id. at 864 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 230. Id. Notably, in resolving this claim, the court “examin[ed] all the circumstances,” includ-
ing “the knowledge and intentions of all persons involved in the interrogation,” a standard consistent 
with Bryant. Id. at 865. 
 231. Id. at 864. The court elaborated as follows: 
N. made his statements in a formal setting, in response to structured questions about past 
events with potential serious consequences for youth, as we have noted. From a function-
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The S.P. case, and cases like it, raises several important and unre-
solved issues, including (1) whether more than one primary purpose is 
possible; (2) if not, how to determine whether a forensic or medical di-
agnosis purpose is the primary one; (3) whether primary-purpose analy-
sis should take into account laws that impose mandatory reporting obli-
gations, and similarly, whether it matters that the interrogating party rou-
tinely refers potential criminal matters to law enforcement;232 and (4) 
whether the confrontation right should depend on the extent of govern-
mental involvement in interrogations conducted by nonstate actors, an 
issue addressed in the next section. 
C. Nonstate Interrogators 
A threshold question in many Confrontation Clause claims is 
whether the Clause applies at all to statements made to nonstate actors. If 
such statements are categorically unprotected, this could create the very 
type of “open-ended exception[] from the confrontation requirement” 
that Crawford sought to curtail.233 
The Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed234 whether and 
when statements to nonstate actors would be testimonial,235 but lower 
courts have often considered the issue and have applied a vast array of 
approaches. The varied approaches merit discussion as they illustrate just 
how many different avenues there are for interpretation under current 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
One group of courts has drawn distinctions based on the precise 
level of police involvement in the nonpolice interview, thereby differen-
tiating between different types of nonpolice interrogations.236 Using a 
                                                                                                             
al standpoint, N.’s examination was similar to the ex parte examinations condemned in 
Crawford. N. acted as a witness; he bore testimony against youth. 
Id. 
 232. See, e.g., State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. S.P., 178 P.3d 318, 329 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (not-
ing this factor as one of many factors justifying its decision). 
 233. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (“The text of the Sixth Amendment 
does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed by 
the courts.”). 
 234. The Court has done so implicitly, however, in Davis. See S.P., 215 P.3d at 857 (“[T]he 
Court in Davis was willing to consider statements testimonial when the declarant made them to 
someone acting as an agent of a law enforcement organization, e.g., a 9-1-1 operator.”). 
 235. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 n.3 (2011) (“Davis explicitly reserved the 
question of ‘whether and when statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel 
are “testimonial.”’ We have no need to decide that question in this case either because Covington’s 
statements were made to police officers.” (citation omitted)); see also id. at 1169 n.1 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“I remain agnostic about whether and when statements to nonstate actors are testimoni-
al.” (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823, n.2 (2006))). 
 236. Compare State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349 (Or. 2004) (deeming testimonial statements made 
by a child-witness to a social worker due to a high level of police involvement in the social worker’s 
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second approach, another group has employed more of a bright-line rule, 
treating all statements made to nonpolice interrogators “not testimonial 
per se,” while treating statements made in response to police interroga-
tion “per se testimonial.”237 A third group of courts has treated the identi-
ty of the interrogator as just one factor among many in the totality of cir-
cumstances.238 A fourth set of courts has entirely ignored the extent to 
which police were involved in the interrogation, instead distinguishing 
statements based on their accusatory or nonaccusatory nature.239 Others 
have deemed such statements categorically unprotected by the Clause, 
regardless of the level of police involvement in the interrogation and re-
gardless of the accusatory or nonaccusatory nature of the statements.240 
Calhoun represents an example of the last category. There, the 
court found it significant that the victim made his accusatory statements 
(that it was Chico and Worm who shot him) to a nongovernment actor, 
even though a police officer was present at the time.241 According to the 
court, “[The] decedent’s statement was not . . . made to a police officer 
during the course of an interrogation. Instead, the statement was made to 
Williams, a private citizen. Thus, the Sixth Amendment is not implicated 
as the statements were nontestimonial.”242 
Exemplifying the first-listed approach, Oregon courts examine the 
nonpolice interrogator’s degree of cooperation with the police. At one 
end of this spectrum lies substantial police involvement in nonpolice in-
terviews. State v. Mack243 is exemplary. In Mack, police unsuccessfully 
attempted to interview a three-year-old child about a murder he had wit-
nessed.244 A State Department of Human Services caseworker then ques-
                                                                                                             
interview), with State v. Bella, 220 P.3d 128, 131 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (deeming nontestimonial 
statements made by a crime victim to an emergency room physician where there was no evidence of 
police involvement in the medical interview). 
 237. See Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d 299, 306 (Mass. 2008). 
 238. See, e.g., Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 714 (Nev. 2006) (“Together, Crawford, Davis, 
and Hammon demonstrate that when determining whether a statement is testimonial, it is necessary 
to look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement.”). According to the court, one 
of those factors includes “to whom the statement was made, a government agent or acquaintance.” 
Id. 
 239. See, e.g., In re T.T., 892 N.E.2d 1163, 1176–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (distinguishing state-
ments by a sexual abuse victim made to a physician that “describ[ed] the cause of symptoms or 
pain” from those statements that “identif[ied] respondent as the perpetrator”; reasoning based on the 
accusatory or nonaccusatory nature of each particular statement, rather than the level of police or 
prosecutor involvement in the interview). 
 240. See, e.g., People v. R.F., 825 N.E.2d 287, 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“Crawford applies 
only to statements made to governmental officials; Crawford does not apply to statements made to 
nongovernmental personnel, such as family members or physicians.”). 
 241. See State v. Calhoun, 657 S.E.2d 424, 425, 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
 242. Id. at 427. 
 243. State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349 (Or. 2004). 
 244. Id. at 350. 
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tioned the child while police videotaped the interview; the caseworker 
later explained that “the primary intent during the [] interview . . . was 
for law enforcement to be able to complete their investigation.”245 Later, 
upon police request, the caseworker interviewed the child at his home 
while police videotaped the conversation.246 Applying Crawford, the 
Oregon Supreme Court deemed the child’s statements testimonial be-
cause, for all intents and purposes, they were made during police interro-
gation, where the caseworker served “as a proxy for the police.”247 
More recently, in 2009, the en banc Oregon Supreme Court recon-
firmed that health care professionals can become police agents for Con-
frontation Clause purposes248 and held that statements made to health 
care professionals in the course of medical treatment can be testimonial 
if the professionals are also acting as interrogators.249 After a thorough 
evaluation of the case, the court found it significant that “the involve-
ment of law enforcement in CARES is pervasive”;250 that CARES em-
ployees “were inquiring about past conduct that potentially could lead to 
[criminal convictions], as police officers do when they interview the vic-
tims of crime”;251 and that “a police officer observed the entire process” 
and later “spoke with [the victim’s] mother about the ‘ongoing investiga-
tion.’”252 Regarding the CARES program as a whole, the court felt that 
“an interview by CARES staff acts as a substitute for an interview with 
the police.”253 Courts of other states, including Maryland and California, 
                                                 
 245. Id. at 349–50 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the DHS worker, “[S]he 
would have asked [the victim] the same questions even if the officers had not [been involved].” Id. at 
350 n.1. For this first interview, “Snyder [the DHS worker] initially understood that she would be 
present at the interview as a support for [the child-declarant]” and to “use her expertise interviewing 
children to facilitate the officers’ interview.” Id. at 350. But when the detective was unable to estab-
lish a dialogue with the child, Snyder “assumed the primary role” in questioning the child about the 
crime. Id. 
 246. Id. at 350. 
 247. Id. at 352. This ruling affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the statements at issue were 
testimonial because a government officer, acting as an agent of the police, questioned the child-
declarant in a manner structured to obtain information for the State to use in prosecuting the defen-
dant. Id. at 350. 
 248. See State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. S.P., 215 P.3d 847, 857, 862 (Or. 2009) (en banc) (con-
cluding that CARES employees “acted, at least in part, as proxies for the police when they ques-
tioned N. about whether youth had abused him”). 
 249. See id. at 863. The court did not address the argument by the state that statements made to 
medical personnel in the course of receiving treatment are not testimonial because the medical per-
sonnel in the case instead acted as proxies of the police. Id. 
 250. Id. at 862. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
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have reached the same result in cases involving statements made to em-
ployees of similar organizations.254 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are cases involving little to no 
police involvement in the nonpolice interview. Other Oregon cases, in-
cluding State v. Bella255 and State v. K.S.,256 deemed statements nontes-
timonial where there is no evidence of police involvement in a medical 
interview.257 
In K.S., assault victim J. entered a hospital emergency room com-
plaining of bruises across her body.258 After examination, the attending 
nurse prepared a written report in which she noted J.’s statement that she 
was assaulted by her boyfriend.259 The hospital reported the incident to 
local police, as required by law.260 Two subsequent interviews fol-
lowed.261 A police officer first interviewed J. at the hospital; then, after 
the officer departed, a CARES social worker interviewed J.262 During 
this interview, J. identified the defendant, Youth, as the boyfriend she 
mentioned earlier.263 
Youth later argued that both the ER record and the social worker 
summary were testimonial hearsay.264 Deeming the ER record nontesti-
monial,265 the court emphasized that J. “made the out-of-court statements 
found in the ER record for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment” 
and that “there was no police or state involvement in the questioning at 
that time.”266 The court refused to decide whether the social worker’s 
                                                 
 254. See, e.g., People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 2004) (deeming testi-
monial statements of child victim to investigating officer, as well those made to a nonpolice inter-
viewer, at a facility specially designed to interview suspected victims of child abuse where that 
interview took place after criminal charges had been filed and where the district attorney who prose-
cuted the case was present); Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 47 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (holding 
that out-of-court statements describing sexual abuse made by children during an interview with a 
social services investigator were testimonial because “[t]he children were interviewed for the ex-
pressed purpose of developing their testimony by [the social worker], under the relevant Maryland 
statute that provides for the testimony of certain persons in lieu of a child, in a child sexual abuse 
case” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 255. State v. Bella, 220 P.3d 128 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). 
 256. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. K.S., 209 P.3d 845 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). 
 257. See id. at 849 (emphasizing the lack of police involvement in the interview conducted by 
an emergency room nurse); Bella, 220 P.3d at 131 (deeming significant the fact that the victim’s 
interaction with the interrogating physician did not include participation by law enforcement and that 
the physician did not prepare his written report for the purpose of furthering a police investigation). 
 258. K.S., 209 P.3d at 847. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 847 n.1 (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 419B.005, 419B.010). 
 261. Id. at 847. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 848. 
 265. Id. at 849. 
 266. Id. (emphasis added). 
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summary was properly admitted,267 instead holding that “if there was any 
error, it was harmless.”268 
Both S.P. and K.S. involved interviews conducted by CARES, 
which the Oregon Supreme Court in S.P. established as an organization 
with an institutional dual purpose of medical diagnosis and preservation 
of criminal evidence.269 But in S.P., the CARES interview was deemed 
subject to confrontation, while the CARES interview in K.S. was not. 
Thus, the Oregon cases are inconsistent. Moreover, under the Oregon 
approach—which examines the level of police involvement in the nonpo-
lice interview—any state could effectively bypass the Constitution by 
passing a mandatory reporting statute and adopting a practice of defer-
ring police interrogation until after medical personnel have gathered the 
relevant accusatory information (assuming those medical interviews do 
not entail substantial police involvement). 
In S.P., the investigating personnel were not legally required to re-
port potential crimes, yet the court deemed those statements testimonial 
largely as the result of substantial police involvement in the medical in-
terview. In Bella and in K.S., the investigating personnel, emergency 
room physicians, were required to report potential crimes to the police, 
practically ensuring use of the declarant’s accusatory statements at a later 
criminal trial. Yet, the court in those cases deemed the statements exempt 
from confrontation.270 In both sets of cases, however, the declarant did 
exactly what a witness would do if called to testify, and the prosecutor 
later used the declarant’s statements for the same purpose: to help con-
vict the defendant by identifying the defendant as the assailant. In both 
sets of cases, the need for confrontation is the same. For this reason, the 
identity of the interrogator and the precise level of police involvement in 
                                                 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 849–50. 
 269. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. S.P., 215 P.3d 847, 859–62 (Or. 2009) (noting that CARES 
routinely provides law enforcement with the results of its evaluations and that law enforcement, in 
turn, often sends possible abuse victims to CARES; that it is very common for law enforcement to 
observe the CARES staff interviewing possible victims by means of one-way mirrors and micro-
phones; that as a routine matter, CARES provides police agencies with complete copies of its eval-
uation reports; “that CARES evaluations serve a forensic purpose in addition to any diagnostic pur-
pose”; that CARES receives nearly half of its funding from the Department of Justice; and that 
CARES explicitly deems itself a partner to local police and prosecutors). 
 270. In Bella, the court examined the level of interaction between the local police and an emer-
gency room physician. State v. Bella, 220 P.3d 128, 130–31 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). In evaluating hear-
say statements made to the physician, the court found it significant that the victim’s interaction with 
the physician did not include participation by law enforcement, and that the physician did not pre-
pare his written report for the purpose of furthering a police investigation. Id. According to the court, 
the State’s mandatory reporting requirements, which imposed a legal duty to report possible crimes 
to the police, did not alter the physician’s primary purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment, nor 
did it make the examining physician an “agent” of the police. Id. at 132. 
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the interrogation should not make the difference between a constitutional 
violation, on the one hand, and a case that does not even implicate the 
Constitution, on the other. 
The better approach is to focus on the nature of the statements ra-
ther than the level of police involvement in the interrogation. This alter-
native approach is consistent with the rulings of other courts that have 
addressed this issue. In People v. Purcell,271 for example, an Illinois ap-
peals court considered whether an assault victim’s statements to an ex-
amining physician at a hospital were testimonial.272 In resolving that is-
sue, the court distinguished between statements describing the victim’s 
injuries, which the court deemed nontestimonial, and those that identified 
Purcell as the attacker, which the court deemed testimonial.273 The court 
drew this distinction despite no evidence of police involvement in the 
physician’s interview.274 
Another Illinois case, In re T.T.,275 applied the same approach, 
drawing distinctions based on the accusatory or nonaccusatory nature of 
the statements and disregarding whether police were involved in the in-
terview.276 In T.T., the court considered the admissibility of out-of-court 
statements made by a seven-year-old victim of sexual abuse, including 
statements made to her examining physician and to a social worker.277 
Regarding the statements made to the physician, the court distinguished 
the victim’s “statements describing the cause of symptoms or pain”278 
from those “identifying respondent as the perpetrator.”279 According to 
the court, the accusatory or nonaccusatory nature of each particular 
statement is the critical distinguishing feature.280 
Applying a similar rationale to the social worker’s interview,281 the 
T.T. court held that the lack of police or prosecutor involvement in that 
interview “do[es] nothing to alter the testimonial nature” of the victim’s 
                                                 
 271. People v. Purcell, 846 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 272. Id. at 211. 
 273. Id. at 215. According to the court, “Crawford [gives] defendant the right to bar [the physi-
cian] from testifying to the portion of [the victim’s] statements in which she described defendant’s 
attack with the stun gun.” Id. The court, however, concluded that the Crawford error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 215–16. 
 274. Id. at 215. 
 275. In re T.T., 892 N.E.2d 1163 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
 276. See id. at 1175–76. 
 277. See id. at 1174–78. 
 278. Id. at 1176. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 1177. As the court declared, “[the victim’s] accusatory statements identifying [de-
fendant] as the perpetrator” or those “concern[ing] fault or identity” are ones that “do implicate the 
core concerns protected by the Confrontation Clause,” whereas statements that “do not accuse or 
identify the perpetrator” do not. Id. 
 281. See id. at 1175. 
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statements.282 According to the court, the particular statements in this 
case were the types of accusatory statements that concerned Crawford—
namely, ones more akin to “formal statement[s] to a government officer,” 
which are testimonial, rather than “casual remark[s] to an acquaintance,” 
which are not.283 Courts of other states have employed a similar ap-
proach, focusing on the content of the questions and answers at issue ra-
ther than the identity of the interrogator.284 
In sum, courts have applied different approaches when analyzing 
whether the Clause applies to statements made to nonstate actors in cases 
involving structured interviews.285 Courts in some jurisdictions, includ-
ing Oregon, have distinguished testimonial from nontestimonial state-
ments by examining the level of police involvement in the nonpolice in-
terview.286 Illinois courts have approached the issue by examining the 
                                                 
 282. Id. at 1175–76. On this issue, the court examined “the extent to which [the social worker] 
was working to assist the prosecutorial effort” but did not find that factor controlling. Id. at 1175. 
Under that analysis, the court found it significant that in accordance with governing statutes, “DCFS 
immediately refers reports of alleged child sexual abuse to the police and [prosecutors] for” possible 
criminal investigation and DCFS investigators routinely interview the people residing in the victim’s 
home, the alleged perpetrator, and other people who may be helpful in a subsequent criminal inves-
tigation. Id. 
 283. Id. at 1175, 1174. The T.T. court’s reasoning on this issue is somewhat less explicit than 
in other areas of its opinion. Here, the court declared, 
After several unsuccessful attempts to contact G.F. and her mother, Lewis eventually in-
terviewed G.F. in May during an unscheduled visit to their home. Lewis introduced her-
self to G.F., assessed G.F.’s credibility and then interviewed her utilizing open-ended 
questions. During this interview, G.F. accused respondent of . . . acts of sexual as-
sault . . . . In the context of a confrontation clause analysis, where the focus is on whether 
the declarant is bearing witness against a criminal defendant when making a formal 
statement to a government officer with an eye toward prosecution, G.F.’s statements to 
Lewis were testimonial. 
Id. at 1175. 
 284. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 197 P.3d 815 (Kan. 2008) The court deemed testimonial state-
ments a shooting victim made to paramedics as he was being transported to the hospital because 
though the victim “was in the midst of a medical emergency, the paramedics’ questions . . . were not 
designed to deal with the immediate danger. Rather, the questions about the identity of the shooter 
related to past events and sought information above and beyond what was necessary to administer 
medical care.” Id. at 820. Moreover, one of the questioners “acknowledged that the information 
obtained through their questioning often helps the police where the patient has been transported from 
the scene quickly.” Id. And here, “there was apparently no [prior] opportunity for [the victim] to be 
interrogated by [police] . . . .”). Id. 
 285. The Crawford Court also included “business records or statements in furtherance of a 
conspiracy” within its list of nontestimonial statements, but that statement should be read as a gener-
al rule only, as some business records could indeed qualify as testimonial. Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 55 (2004); see also Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1175 (2011) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 286. Compare State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349, 352 (Or. 2004) (applying Crawford and deeming 
declarant’s hearsay statements testimonial because, for all intents and purposes, they were made 
during police interrogation where the social worker who took the statements served “as a proxy for 
the police”), with State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. K.S., 209 P.3d 845, 849 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (deem-
ing hearsay declarant’s statements nontestimonial due to the lack of police involvement in the inter-
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content of the victim’s statements, finding the involvement of police irre-
levant to the analysis.287 Courts have also applied other various ap-
proaches.288 
As developed more fully in Part V, if a nonpolice interrogator ob-
tains accusatory statements from a would-be witness, whether volun-
teered or the result of interrogation, and if those statements are taken out-
side the res gestae of the crime, the statements should be deemed testi-
monial and subject to confrontation. In both types of cases, the out-of-
court statements “do precisely what a witness does on direct examina-
tion,”289 thereby triggering the same confrontation concerns and making 
the accusation ripe for cross-examination. 
Even the Supreme Court has suggested that the identity of the inter-
rogator should not be the controlling factor;290 according to the Court, 
purely volunteered statements made in the absence of interrogation can 
qualify as testimonial.291 Thus, the result should not categorically differ 
when a nonpolice interrogator asks a question that elicits the same re-
sponse as one asked by law enforcement.292 The Sixth Amendment, by 
its terms, applies to “all criminal prosecutions” and protects all criminal 
defendants, not just those whose accusers happen to have been ques-
tioned by certain individuals.293 
                                                                                                             
view conducted by an emergency room nurse), and State v. Bella, 220 P.3d 128, 131 (Or. Ct. App. 
2009) (deeming significant the fact that the victim’s interaction with the interrogating physician did 
not include participation by law enforcement). 
 287. See, e.g., In re T.T., 892 N.E.2d at 1165 (distinguishing hearsay statements based on the 
accusatory or nonaccusatory nature of the statements, and disregarding whether police were involved 
in the interview). 
 288. See, e.g., Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 714 (Nev. 2006) (examining “the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the statement,” where the interrogator’s identity is one of many factors to 
consider). 
 289. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006) (emphasis removed). 
 290. Responses to structured police questioning are subject to confrontation (as in Crawford), 
as are responses to the less-structured questioning of an agent of the police (as in Davis). See Craw-
ford, 541 U.S. at 65–66; Davis, 547 U.S. at 821–22. 
 291. The Davis Court arguably conceded that statements made in the absence of any interroga-
tion are not necessarily nontestimonial when it declared, “[I]t is in the final analysis the declarant’s 
statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.” 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 n.1; see also State v. Warsame, 735 N.W.2d 684, 692 (Minn. 2007) (“Volun-
teered statements may be testimonial.”). 
 292. As Justice Scalia has noted, “The Clause applies to volunteered testimony as well as 
statements solicited through police interrogation.” Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1169 (2011) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). For this reason, Justice Scalia argued that “[a] declarant-focused inquiry 
is . . . the only inquiry that would work in every fact pattern implicating the Confrontation Clause.” 
Id. 
 293. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; cf. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (“[T]he Constitu-
tion sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.”). 
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IV. THE CONFRONTATION EXCEPTIONS 
A. Forfeiture by Wrongdoing 
The leading confrontation exception, forfeiture by wrongdoing (for-
feiture exception), provides yet another means of evading confrontation 
under the Crawford framework. Broadly speaking, when the forfeiture 
exception applies, a defendant loses his right to confront a witness on the 
theory that the defendant, through his wrongdoing, “has been the instru-
ment of the denial of his own right of cross-examination.”294 Typical cas-
es include those involving acts of bribery or witness intimidation that 
cause the witness’s absence from court.295 Under such a scenario, the 
witness’s prior testimonial statements become admissible despite no op-
portunity for cross-examination.296 
While Crawford recognized forfeiture by wrongdoing as an excep-
tion to the Sixth Amendment confrontation right,297 the particular re-
quirements of the exception remained unclear. Between 2004 and 2008, 
lower courts adopted different views of the exception, one narrow and 
one broad.298 According to the broad view, evidence of any wrongdoing 
that effectively prevents a witness from testifying is sufficient to invoke 
the exception.299 The more limited view required not only evidence of 
wrongdoing but also evidence that the wrongdoing had been committed 
with the intent to prevent the witness from testifying.300 
                                                 
 294. State v. Langley, 354 N.W.2d 389, 400 (Minn. 1984). 
 295. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 374 (2008) (“The common-law forfeiture rule was 
aimed at removing the otherwise powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill the 
witnesses against them . . . .”). 
 296. See, e.g., United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1360 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the 
defendant waived his right to confrontation when he intimidated a witness into not testifying at trial). 
 297. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6, 62 (2004) (recognizing forfeiture by 
wrongdoing and dying declarations as exceptions to the Crawford rule). 
 298. See State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 850 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (“[C]ourts have disagreed 
over the [applicability of] the intent requirement.”). Unlike a bribe or an act of witness intimidation, 
where the very actions of the wrongdoer reveal his intent, not all “wrongful acts” that lead to the 
witness’s absence from trial should necessarily trigger the forfeiture exception. For example, a de-
fendant who negligently collides into a witness’s automobile the evening before trial, causing her to 
miss her scheduled testimony, would not forfeit his confrontation right. This is true even though the 
defendant’s negligence is considered “wrongful.” Between these extremes, however, is a plethora of 
wrongdoing that may or may not trigger the forfeiture exception. For further discussion of forfeiture 
by wrongdoing and use of a similar example to the one above, see People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
843, 850–51 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 299. Many courts had rejected the rule requiring intent to prevent the witness from testifying. 
See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370–71 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying forfeiture in 
murder case with facts similar to Giles); People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1, 5 (Colo. App. 2004) (same); 
State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 794–95 (Kan. 2004) (applying forfeiture to admit statements of dying 
victim in murder case). 
 300. Pre-Giles, many courts had endorsed the intent requirement later adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Giles. See, e.g., People v. Moreno, 160 P.3d 242, 247 (Colo. 2007) (ruling defendant’s 
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The Supreme Court resolved the dispute in Giles v. California,301 
opting for the narrow interpretation. According to Giles, the forfeiture 
exception requires proof of two things: (1) an actus reus, consisting of an 
act of wrongdoing that prevents a witness from testifying; and (2) a mens 
rea, requiring proof of a specific intent to prevent such testimony.302 
While Giles clarified that forfeiture requires proof of intent to pre-
vent trial testimony,303 a specific act of cooperation in a criminal investi-
gation, the Giles majority seemed to lessen the prosecutor’s burden of 
proof in domestic abuse cases.304 The Court, in dicta,305 declared: 
The dissent closes by pointing out that a forfeiture rule which ig-
nores Crawford would be particularly helpful to women in abusive 
relationships . . . . [W]e are puzzled by the dissent’s [position] . . . . 
Domestic violence is an intolerable offense . . . . But for that serious 
crime, as for others, abridging the constitutional rights of criminal 
defendants is not in the State’s arsenal. 
                                                                                                             
wrongful conduct must have been “designed, at least in part, to subvert the criminal justice system 
by depriving that system of the evidence upon which it depends”); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 
N.E.2d 158, 170 (Mass. 2005) (“Defendant forfeits . . . the right to object to the admission of an 
unavailable witness’s out-of-court statements . . . on finding[] that . . . the defendant acted with the 
intent to procure the witness’s unavailability.”); Romero, 133 P.3d at 855–56 (requiring intent to 
silence to invoke the forfeiture doctrine, and rejecting argument that the requisite intent can be in-
ferred). 
 301. Giles, 554 U.S. 353. 
 302. Id. at 361. 
 303. See In re Rolandis G., 902 N.E.2d 600, 615 (Ill. 2008) (“The [Giles] Court held that at 
common law an unconfronted testimonial statement could not be admitted without a showing that 
the defendant intended to prevent the witness from testifying. In other words, according to the Court, 
for forfeiture by wrongdoing to apply, the evidence had to show that the defendant engaged in wit-
ness tampering or some type of conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying, thwart the 
judicial process, or procure the witness’[s] absence from trial.” (citing Giles, 554 U.S. at 359–60)); 
Crawford v. Commonwealth, 686 S.E.2d 557, 564 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (en banc) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court made clear in Giles that the [forfeiture-by-wrongdoing] doctrine applied only ‘when the de-
fendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying.’” (citing Giles, 554 U.S. 
at 359)). 
 304. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 376–77. 
 305. While some courts have characterized the disputed Giles statements as part of its holding, 
they are more properly classified as dicta because this portion of the opinion could have easily been 
deleted without seriously altering the analytical foundations of the holding. See Sarnoff v. Am. 
Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1986). Courts distinguish dicta from holdings 
based on this rationale. See State v. Koput, 418 N.W.2d 804, 810–11 (Wis. 1988) (overturning the 
lower appellate court’s decision, in part, because “[t]he portion of the opinion . . . on which the court 
of appeals relied . . . could have been omitted without doing violence to the logic of the opinion” and 
is therefore “irrelevant to the ratio decidendi”); Pierre N. Leval, Madison Lecture: Judging Under 
the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1256 (2006) (“If the court’s judgment 
and the reasoning which supports it would remain unchanged, regardless of the proposition in ques-
tion, that proposition plays no role in explaining why the judgment goes for the winner. It is super-
fluous to the decision and is dictum.”). 
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The domestic-violence context is, however, relevant for a separate 
reason. Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a 
victim from resorting to outside help, and include conduct designed 
to prevent testimony to police officers or cooperation in criminal 
prosecutions. Where such an abusive relationship culminates in 
murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime expressed 
the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse 
to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution—
rendering her prior statements admissible under the forfeiture doc-
trine. Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the 
victim from resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to 
this inquiry, as would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at 
which the victim would have been expected to testify.306 
While the first part of the above passage seems to reject the dis-
sent’s more lenient standard in cases of domestic abuse, the second part 
provides multiple avenues for evading the confrontation right.307 Indeed, 
this passage could permit a court to infer the requisite Giles intent based 
solely on the fact of the relationship.308 Yet, it makes little sense to re-
quire proof that the defendant purposefully silenced the would-be wit-
ness if the requirement can be satisfied by establishing an abusive rela-
tionship.309 This, however, is a reasonable interpretation of the majority’s 
passage. 
Moreover, the final sentence of the above passage appears to permit 
the requisite intent to be inferred from prior interactions between the de-
fendant and witness, even if the particular act of wrongdoing that caused 
                                                 
 306. Giles, 554 U.S. at 376–77 (emphasis added). 
 307. The quoted portion of the Giles opinion was written in direct response to the dissent’s 
proposed standard, which would have eased the burden of proving forfeiture in cases of domestic 
abuse. Id. at 376. Moreover, Giles itself involved incidents of domestic abuse, and after this passage, 
the majority directs the lower court to “consider evidence of [Giles’s] intent on remand.” Id. at 377. 
So the above passage can reasonably be read as identifying the types of evidence relevant to that 
inquiry. See State v. Hubbard, No. W2007-024820-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2568200, at *8 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. Nov. 3, 2009) (describing the pertinent Giles passage as “guidance with respect to the 
types of evidence that may be available to establish a defendant’s intent to prevent testimony in 
cases involving domestic violence”). 
 308. In his concurrence, Justice Souter read the Giles dictum to mean that the requisite “ele-
ment of intention would normally be satisfied by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic ab-
user in the classic abusive relationship.” Giles, 554 U.S. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring in part). But 
see In re Rolandis G., 902 N.E.2d at 614 (refusing to presume the requisite Giles intent based upon 
the fact of abuse alone). 
 309. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 404–05 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[Justice Souter’s concurrence] 
seems to say that a showing of domestic abuse is sufficient to call into play the protection of the 
forfeiture rule in a trial for murder of the domestic abuse victim. Doing so when, in fact, the abuser 
may have had other matters in mind apart from preventing the witness from testifying is in effect not 
to insist upon a showing of ‘purpose.’”). 
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the witness’s absence involved no such intent.310 As the final sentence’s 
wording and structure reveal, this evidence is distinct from “evidence of 
ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been ex-
pected to testify.”311 By loosening the link between the Giles actus reus 
and mens rea requirements, this particular statement provides additional 
means of invoking the forfeiture exception and is one lower courts have 
already ratified.312 
Finally, for cases of domestic abuse, the majority appears to expand 
its specific intent requirement to encompass not just intent to prevent a 
witness from testifying, a very specific act of cooperation, but also intent 
to prevent “cooperat[ion] with a criminal prosecution” more generally.313 
According to the majority, “Where . . . an abusive relationship culmi-
nates in murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime ex-
pressed the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting 
abuse to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution—
rendering her prior statements admissible under the forfeiture doc-
trine.”314 Intent to prevent a witness from “reporting abuse” or from 
“cooperating with a criminal prosecution” is much broader in scope, and 
                                                 
 310. See, e.g., State v. Her, 781 N.W.2d 869, 874 (Minn. 2010) (remanding for determination 
of defendant’s intent under Giles). The Her court explained that in a case decided before Giles, “we 
did not require any showing that the defendant intended to prevent his wife from testifying against 
him,” but that “there was evidence in [that case] that, approximately four years before the murder, 
the defendant had threatened to murder the victim if she reported his abuse to the police.” Id. “Evi-
dence of this type of threat would be relevant evidence under the standard announced in Giles.” Id. 
 311. Giles, 554 U.S. at 377. This reading is consistent with the court’s analysis in State v. 
McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 257, 272–73 & n.10 (Mo. 2008) (noting that Giles “clarified” “[t]he para-
meters of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine,” and upholding trial court’s determination that 
defendant forfeited his right to confront the murder victim based on (1) the defendant’s prior acts of 
domestic violence committed “during the time that [the victim] was attempting to break from the 
relationship [with defendant]”; and (2) the fact that defendant murdered his victim within one month 
after he was formally charged with burglarizing her mobile home). 
 312. See, e.g., State v. Baldwin, 794 N.W.2d 769, 779–80 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (rejecting 
defendant’s argument that his past behavior and prior attempts to prevent the witness from testifying 
were insufficient to prove forfeiture, and holding that “as noted in Giles, [the defendant’s] past phys-
ical violence and threats to [the witness] are ‘highly relevant’ to a finding of wrongdoing by forfei-
ture, even if alone such evidence is not sufficient proof of his present intent”). Applying that logic, 
the Baldwin court noted “many examples of highly relevant past physical violence and threats,” 
including an instance where the defendant “had previously intimidated [the witness] from appearing 
and testifying in an earlier case.” Id. at 780. 
 313. See State v. Jones, 197 P.3d 815, 821 (Kan. 2008) (interpreting Giles as having “clarified 
that it is insufficient to merely show that the defendant wrongfully caused the absence of a witness in 
order to admit the witness’[s] unconfronted testimony under the forfeiture rule”; rather, “[t]he State 
must show that the defendant intended to prevent the witness from testifying” (emphasis added)); cf. 
Giles, 554 U.S. at 361 (“The manner in which the [forfeiture-by-wrongdoing] rule was applied [at 
common law] makes plain that unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing 
that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying.”). 
 314. Giles, 554 U.S. at 377. 
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provides more avenues of proof, than intent to prevent trial testimony.315 
Thus, this particular passage appears to broaden the Giles requirement 
from one requiring proof of intent to prevent trial testimony to one per-
mitting proof of intent to prevent other forms of cooperation. This is not 
a trivial distinction. Often, victims of domestic violence initially report 
abuse but later choose not to testify.316 Thus, a defendant who kills his 
wife as she picks up the phone to call 911 might be deemed to have for-
feited his right to confront her earlier out-of-court statements in which 
she described prior acts of abuse.317 
Ultimately, the meaning of the majority’s passage is open to consi-
derable debate. After all, this passage was written in response to the dis-
sent’s proposed standard that would have lessened the burden of proving 
forfeiture in cases of domestic abuse, and while the first paragraph of the 
above passage purports to reject the dissent’s more lenient standard,318 
the second paragraph goes a long way toward adopting it. 
The ambiguity of the Giles dictum has led to inconsistent applica-
tion of the forfeiture exception among lower courts. The Illinois Supreme 
Court, for example, interpreted the passage narrowly and concluded that 
Giles requires evidence that “the accused was motivated by the desire to 
prevent the witness from testifying against him at trial.”319 One year lat-
er, the California Court of Appeal interpreted the Giles dictum more ex-
pansively and held that forfeiture applies not only to acts intended to 
                                                 
 315. See, e.g., People v. Banos, 100 Cal Rptr. 3d 476, 491 (Ct. App. 2009) (interpreting the 
Giles dictum, and holding that the forfeiture exception applies not only to acts intended to prevent a 
witness from testifying, as Giles held, but also to acts intended to dissuade a witness from cooperat-
ing with law enforcement authorities generally, as the Giles dictum implied). 
 316. Aviva Orenstein, Her Last Words: Dying Declarations and Modern Confrontation Juri-
sprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1411, 1433 (2010) (“[V]ictims of intimate violence often recant or 
refuse to testify.” For this reason, “[b]efore Crawford, many jurisdictions had a . . . victimless prose-
cution policy that depended on the admissibility of the victim’s out-of-court-statements.”). 
 317. In State v. Warsame, the prosecution argued that statements of the out-of-court declarant, 
a woman who had called 911 to report a recent assault by her boyfriend-defendant, should have been 
admitted under the forfeiture exception because the defendant had cut the phone line in attempt to 
prevent the victim from calling the police. 723 N.W.2d 637, 643 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d in part 
and rev’d in part, 735 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 2007). The court rejected the argument, reasoning that 
“the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing referred to in Davis is that which arises from a defendant’s procuring 
the witness’s absence at trial.” Id. While arguably correct under Davis, this result might change 
under Giles. Under the Giles dictum, an abusive husband who kills his wife as she attempts to dial 
911 to report his abuse might be deemed to have forfeited his right to confront her prior accusatory 
statements. 
 318. Commentators agree. See, e.g., Orenstein, supra note 316, at 1437 (“The majority was 
positively disdainful of a suggestion it attributed to the dissent, that ‘a forfeiture rule which ignores 
Crawford would be particularly helpful to women in abusive relationships—or at least particularly 
helpful in punishing their abusers.’” (quoting Giles, 544 U.S. at 376)). 
 319. In re Rolandis G., 902 N.E.2d 600, 616 (Ill. 2008). 
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prevent a witness from testifying but also to acts more generally intended 
to dissuade a witness from cooperating with law enforcement.320 
In Crawford v. Commonwealth, a 2009 decision issued by the en 
banc Virginia Court of Appeals,321 the majority characterized the perti-
nent Giles passage as part of the Giles “holding.”322 Treating the Giles 
passage as binding, the majority “left open the possibility that a defen-
dant’s intention to prevent testimony might be inferred from the sur-
rounding circumstances, such as in a case of ongoing domestic vi-
olence.”323 
Crawford v. Commonwealth’s dissenting judges interpreted the 
Giles passage far differently. According to the dissent, Giles requires 
proof “that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testify-
ing.”324 Rejecting the implication that Giles “created a whole new 
                                                 
 320. Banos, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 491. In Banos, defendant Manuel Banos was convicted of 
killing his ex-girlfriend, Mary Ann Cortez. Id. at 485. Banos had been arrested multiple times before 
Cortez was killed. Id. at 479. In the first incident, Cortez called 911 and placed the phone down as 
she and Banos argued. Id. at 480. In the 911 recording, Banos repeatedly makes statements such as 
“Are you going to speak to the cops . . . or am I going to kill you?” Id. Banos later attacked and 
killed Cortez. Id. at 481–82. At Banos’s murder trial, the prosecutor admitted certain out-of-court 
statements under the forfeiture exception. Id. at 482. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. Id. at 
484. Interpreting Giles, the court ruled that forfeiture applies not only to acts intended to prevent a 
witness from testifying but also to acts intended to dissuade a witness from cooperating with law 
enforcement authorities more generally. Id. at 491. Applying this interpretation, the court found 
substantial evidence that Banos killed Cortez to prevent her from cooperating with authorities, in-
cluding Banos’s 911 statements where Banos threatened to kill Cortez if she did not “shut up.” Id. 
 321. Crawford v. Commonwealth, 686 S.E.2d 557 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (en banc). In Crawford 
v. Commonwealth, Anthony Crawford was charged with murdering his wife Sarah. Id. at 562. A 
great deal of evidence linked Crawford to the killing, including DNA and fingerprint evidence re-
covered from the crime scene. Id. Not long before her killing, Sarah had obtained a protective order 
against the defendant. Id. at 560. In a signed affidavit, Sarah recounted incidents in which Crawford 
abused her and threatened her life. Id. At Crawford’s murder trial, the court admitted the affidavit 
under the forfeiture exception, and Crawford was convicted of the murder. Id. at 562. After subse-
quent appeals, the en banc Virginia Court of Appeals rejected Crawford’s confrontation challenge 
and affirmed his murder conviction, albeit by deeming the affidavit at issue nontestimonial. See id. at 
567–69. 
 322. Because Justice Scalia’s Giles opinion was a plurality opinion, the court interpreted the 
Giles holding as encompassing “that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judg-
ments on the narrowest grounds.” Crawford, 686 S.E.2d at 564 n.11 (quoting Marks v. United 
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). According to the en banc majority, all but Part II.D.2 of Justice 
Scalia’s Giles opinion “constitutes the holding of Giles, as it is the narrowest position of at least five 
Justices concurring in the result.” Id. The Giles passage quoted above is contained in Part II.E of 
Justice Scalia’s Giles opinion. The majority later reiterated its broad reading of the Giles “holding” 
in a footnote: “the holding of Giles is that the forfeiture doctrine is broader than simply killing a 
witness to prevent that witness from testifying in a pending case.” Id. at 566 n.12. Further, “Giles 
holds that the forfeiture doctrine also applies in domestic violence situations where there is evidence 
of ‘the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities or cooperat-
ing with a criminal prosecution.’” Id. (emphasis removed) (quoting Giles, 544 U.S. at 377). 
 323. Id. at 564. 
 324. Id. at 569 (Elder, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Giles, 544 U.S. at 
361). 
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test . . . in the domestic context,” the dissent argued that the Giles dictum 
merely restates the methods by which intent is generally inferred.325 Ac-
cording to the dissent, “[I]n any case in which proof of intent is required, 
intent may . . . be established with circumstantial evidence,”326 such as 
“the accused’s statements and conduct . . . .”327 In the dissent’s view, the 
Giles dictum “hardly breaks new legal ground.”328 
The following year, the Supreme Court of Minnesota quoted exten-
sively from the Giles dictum before remanding the case for an eviden-
tiary hearing on intent to silence, presumably directing the lower court to 
consider whether to infer intent from the types of evidence provided in 
Giles.329 
As these cases and others that have applied the exception illu-
strate,330 lower courts applying the seemingly strict Giles rule, particular-
ly in cases of domestic abuse, have found yet another means to evade 
confrontation. In this manner, the right of confrontation has become even 
more manipulable. 
B. Dying Declarations 
Crawford identified the dying declarations hearsay exception as 
another potential avenue for testimonial statements to be admitted in the 
absence of confrontation.331 While the Supreme Court has explicitly rati-
fied forfeiture by wrongdoing as an exception to the Confrontation 
Clause,332 the Court has yet to resolve whether the common law dying 
                                                 
 325. Id. at 572. 
 326. Crawford, 686 S.E.2d at 572. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. State v. Her, 781 N.W.2d 869, 876–77 (Minn. 2010). According to the Her court, “The 
[Giles] Court’s emphasis on the relevance of the domestic violence context to the intent requirement 
should be helpful in making this determination.” Id. at 877. 
 330. See, e.g., State v. Fry, 926 N.E.2d 1239, 1262 (Ohio 2010) (interpreting the pertinent 
Giles dictum as holding “that the forfeiture doctrine would apply in many domestic-violence cases 
where the victim’s statement was introduced after the victim was killed,” and ratifying the jury’s 
finding that defendant killed his ex-girlfriend to prevent her from testifying against him in a future 
criminal proceeding). 
 331. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004) (“Although many dying declara-
tions may not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting even those that clearly are. We need not 
decide in this case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying 
declarations.” (citations omitted)). 
 332. See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2687–88 (2008) (ratifying forfeiture by wrong-
doing as a valid post-Crawford exception, and deeming the exception applicable when the defendant 
has engaged in conduct specifically designed to prevent the witness from testifying). 
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declaration remains an exception as well.333 For now, the issue lies in the 
hands of the lower courts. 
The common law dying-declaration exception admits out-of-court 
statements for their truth when (1) the declarant is unavailable; (2) the 
statement concerns the cause of the declarant’s impending death; and (3) 
the statement is made while the declarant believes death is imminent.334 
Dying declarations are often testimonial as, for example, when a 
soon-to-be-deceased person describes the cause of her death to a police 
officer with the purpose of implicating the accused.335 Thus, the dying- 
declaration exception is sometimes the only means of evading an other-
wise valid constitutional claim, as in Clay.336 Despite this reality—or 
perhaps because of it—nearly every lower court that considered the issue 
post-Crawford has recognized and applied the dying-declarations con-
frontation exception when given the opportunity.337 With such uniform 
acceptance, the dying-declaration exception, as it has been applied by the 
courts, threatens to further undermine Crawford’s aims. 
                                                 
 333. Commentators believe, however, that the Court will eventually declare dying declarations 
admissible as an exception to the Confrontation Clause once the issue is squarely before the Court. 
See Orenstein, supra note 316, at 1414. 
 334. Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d 299, 312 (Mass. 2008). 
 335. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 147 (Tenn. 2007); see also Orenstein, supra 
note 316, at 1445 (“[D]ying declaration [often] forms an outright refutation of Crawford’s rule con-
cerning testimonial statements.”). 
 336. See People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598, 607–11 (App. Div. 2011) (deeming the hearsay 
statement at issue testimonial, but admitting the evidence under the dying declarations confrontation 
exception). In contrast to Bryant, the Clay court had the benefit of a dying declaration argument that 
had been preserved on appeal. Id. at 601. Thus, the Clay court, unlike the Bryant Court, was able to 
avoid the potential confrontation problem without employing the concept of ongoing emergency. Cf. 
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1177 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Were the issue proper-
ly tendered here, I would take up the question whether the exception for dying declarations survives 
our recent Confrontation Clause decisions.”). 
 337. See, e.g., People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956, 972 (Cal. 2004) (discussing the issue at 
length, and finding that the “dying declarations [exception] poses no conflict with the Sixth 
Amendment”); Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d at 310–11 (ratifying the dying-declaration exception as an ex-
ception well-established at common law); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 711 (Nev. 2006) (“We 
agree with the states that recognize dying declarations as an exception to the Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right.”); Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 609 (approving dying declarations as a Confrontation 
Clause exception, and listing various state court decisions reaching the same result); State v. Beau-
champ, 796 N.W.2d 780, 782–85 (Wis. 2011) (approving dying declarations as a Confrontation 
Clause exception that was “deeply rooted in the common law”); see also Orenstein, supra note 316, 
at 1441 (“With few exceptions, courts post-Crawford have held that dying declarations, even when 
they are testimonial, need not be confronted to be admissible.” (footnote omitted)). 
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V. A BRIGHT-LINE PROPOSAL 
Ohio v. Roberts admitted hearsay statements upon a mere showing 
of reliability as a substitute for actual confrontation.338 After Roberts 
proved easily manipulable,339 Crawford replaced the Roberts test with a 
seemingly rigid cross-examination requirement, one designed to ensure 
actual confrontation.340 Just seven years later, the Court’s Confrontation 
Clause framework has proven just as manipulable as the Roberts rule. 
The primary downfall in the current framework lies in its distinc-
tion between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay. While this distinc-
tion appears stark, the current test is anything but a bright line. Just as 
under Roberts, where multifactor tests were common, Bryant notes more 
than ten factors courts should use to determine whether a statement is 
testimonial and further instructs courts to consider “all [other] relevant 
information,”341 a classic totality-of-the-circumstances approach sure to 
yield unpredictable results. 
As recent case law reveals, courts can easily evade confrontation 
through manipulation of the primary-purpose test, which as currently 
configured, seeks to divine the hidden primary purpose of a similarly 
situated hypothetical declarant or interrogator through application of 
countless factors. This standard is nothing but “an exercise in fic-
tion”342—a Choose Your Own Adventure story where the outcomes are 
unclear and always subject to reversal.343 
To restore the promise of Crawford, a bright-line test is needed to 
replace the current totality-of-the-circumstances test. In designing a re-
placement test, my goals are (1) to retain Crawford’s testimoni-
al/nontestimonial distinction, an improvement over the Roberts reliability 
standard; (2) to avoid the easy means of manipulation inherent in 
                                                 
 338. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 63 (2004). 
 339. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63 (“The [Roberts] framework is so unpredictable that it fails to 
provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations. Reliability is an amorphous, 
if not entirely subjective, concept. There are countless factors bearing on whether a statement is 
reliable.”). 
 340. Id. at 61–63. 
 341. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162. 
 342. Id. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 839 
(2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also id. at 1161 (majority opi-
nion) (“The victim’s injuries could be so debilitating as to prevent her from thinking sufficiently 
clearly to understand whether her statements are for the purpose of addressing an ongoing emergen-
cy or for the purpose of future prosecution.”). 
 343. “Choose Your Own Adventure is a series of children’s gamebooks where . . . the reader 
assum[es] the role of the protagonist and mak[es] choices that determine the main character’s actions 
and the plot’s outcome.” Choose Your Own Adventure, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ch 
oose_Your_Own_Adventure (last modified Oct. 16, 2011). 
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Bryant’s totality-of-the-circumstances test; and (3) to abandon the prima-
ry-purpose charade, a standard full of speculation and guesswork. 
My proposed test has two halves. Under the first half of this test, 
any statements obtained from a would-be witness to a crime during the 
crime’s res gestae would be deemed per se nontestimonial, never subject 
to the confrontation right. Borrowing from the criminal law’s res gestae 
concept,344 this proposed rule would encompass statements made con-
temporaneous with the criminal incident, a timeframe that begins with 
preparations for the crime and ends when the defendant is either in police 
custody or has reached temporary safety.345 
This bright-line substitute for the Bryant test rests on the presump-
tion that questioning occurring during a crime’s res gestae is, in most 
cases, intended to resolve the crime and prevent the criminal from suc-
cessfully escaping, and that statements obtained during that timeframe 
are made for that same purpose. Presumably, statements made within a 
crime’s res gestae would only rarely fit within Crawford’s basic defini-
tion of testimonial: “A solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact”346 for later prosecutorial 
use. At least while a crime is still occurring, or while the suspect is still 
on the loose and being pursued, the declarant and the interrogator are 
typically focused on assessing the situation, dealing with potential 
threats, or apprehending a perpetrator. The intent to record evidence for 
later use might be partly in mind, but this does not become the primary 
objective until after the assailant has either been captured or has escaped. 
The presumption underlying the first half of my proposed test is 
largely supported by recent case holdings. For example, in Bryant, the 
Court found an ongoing emergency existed where an armed shooter had 
fled the scene of the recent shooting and whose whereabouts were still 
unknown.347 In State v. Manigo,348 a New Jersey appellate court differen-
tiated between hearsay statements a deceased victim made to police dur-
ing the initial assessment of the crime, which the court deemed nontesti-
                                                 
 344. Although the res gestae concept itself was embodied in a hearsay exception that existed 
near the time of the Founding, this Article uses the term res gestae in a different sense. 
 345. For purposes of the felony-murder rule, the res gestae period typically begins when the 
actor has reached the point at which she could be prosecuted for an attempt to commit a crime, and it 
continues at least until all of the elements of the crime are completed; further, most courts provide 
that the res gestae of a felony continues, even after commission of the crime, during the felon’s 
flight from the scene until he reaches a place of temporary safety. See, e.g., People v. Salas, 500 P.2d 
7, 15 (Cal. 1972). 
 346. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (cit-
ing WEBSTER, supra note 37). 
 347. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1163–67. 
 348. State v. Manigo, No. 06-03-0355, 2011 WL 3241488, at *10–11, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Aug. 1, 2011). 
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monial, and similar statements made after the defendants had been de-
tained, which the court deemed testimonial. Several additional courts 
have applied the same logic.349 
Under the second half of my test, if police obtain incriminating 
statements from a would-be witness, whether volunteered or in response 
to structured questioning, and if those statements are taken outside the 
res gestae of the crime, then those statements may not be admitted in the 
absence of confrontation. The presumption underlying this aspect of the 
rule is that by the time the res gestae has ended, any structured question-
ing would be deemed testimonial by most courts. This presumption is 
supported by the holdings of various post-Davis cases, many of which 
have deemed testimonial a victim’s statements to police after police had 
secured the scene and had either arrested the assailant or separated him 
from the declarant.350 Once the suspect has been safely secured, it would 
                                                 
 349. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 189–92 (6th Cir. 2007) (“While it may 
often be the case that on-the-scene statements in response to officers’ questions will be testimonial 
because the presence of the officers will alleviate the emergency, this is not one of those cases” 
because defendant “was still at large; [defendant] did not know [the victim] had called 911; and for 
all [the victim] (or the officers) knew [the defendant] remained armed and in the residence imme-
diately in front of them or at least in the nearby vicinity.”); Commonwealth v. Beatrice, No. SJC-
10657, 2011 WL 3199372, at *4 (Mass. July 29, 2011) (“Where a woman has [reported that she has] 
‘just’ been severely beaten by a boy friend . . . , where the woman remains in a neighboring apart-
ment, and where the assailant is ‘packing his stuff’ . . . , it is reasonable to conclude that the ongoing 
emergency continues until the police have arrived and secured the scene, or until the assailant has 
left the scene.”). 
 350. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829–30 (2006) (deeming testimonial a 
victim’s statements to police officers responding to a domestic-violence complaint after police had 
secured the scene and had separated the abusive husband from declarant because declarant’s state-
ments related to what had happened rather than what was currently happening); id. at 828–29 (clari-
fying that an interrogation that begins for the purpose of determining the need for emergency assis-
tance can evolve into testimonial statements once that purpose has been achieved); People v. Cage, 
155 P.3d 205, 217 (Cal. 2007) (holding that an assault victim’s statements to police were testimonial 
because the assailant and victim were geographically separated, the incident had been over for more 
than an hour, and the victim “was in no danger of further violence as to which contemporaneous 
police intervention might be required”); Commonwealth v. Galicia, 857 N.E.2d 463, 470 (Mass. 
2006) (holding that the victim’s statements to police describing assault that occurred less than five 
minutes earlier were testimonial because victim and defendant were separated, “the scene was safe,” 
and “urgency had subsided” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Wright, 726 N.W.2d 464, 
476 (Minn. 2007) (deeming testimonial victims statements to officers investigating a report of a man 
who had pointed a gun at the victims because “by the time police interviewed [the two victims], 
Wright was in police custody”); State v. Fry, 926 N.E.2d 1239, 1260–61 (Ohio 2010) (deeming 
testimonial a victim’s statements to police officers responding to a domestic-violence complaint 
because defendant had already been arrested and removed from the premises, the officer’s primary 
purpose at that time was to investigate a possible crime, and the declarant’s statements related to past 
events rather than what was currently happening); Zapata v. State, 232 S.W.3d 254, 260 (Tex. App. 
2007) (The victim’s statements to police about a recent assault were testimonial because the victim 
was separated from the defendant, there was no evidence of an “ongoing conflict,” and the interro-
gating officer admitted that she was “gathering evidence for prosecution” at the time. (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); Henderson v. Commonwealth, 710 S.E.2d 482, 493–95 (Va. Ct. App. 2011) 
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be virtually impossible for the suspect to pose an ongoing emergency to 
the declarant or the public at large.351 
Along with the res gestae limitation, my proposed rule would apply 
to both police and nonpolice interrogators. Under this aspect of the rule, 
if a nonpolice interrogator obtains accusatory statements from a would-
be witness, whether those statements are volunteered or the result of in-
terrogation, and those statements are taken outside the res gestae of the 
crime, the statements would be deemed testimonial and subject to con-
frontation. 
The Sixth Amendment applies to “all criminal prosecutions” and 
protects all criminal defendants, not just those whose accusers happen to 
have been questioned by certain individuals.352 Regardless of the identity 
of the interrogator, many out-of-court statements “do precisely what a 
witness does on direct examination,” thereby triggering the same con-
frontation concerns and making the accusation ripe for cross-
examination.353 Moreover, as set forth in Part III.C., this approach—
which focuses on the nature of the statements rather than the official or 
unofficial status of the listener—is consistent with the rulings of various 
lower courts that have applied Crawford. 
My proposed rule has several advantages over the current totality-
of-the-circumstances standard. First, unlike the Bryant rule, my proposed 
rule does not require courts to consider countless factors, many of which 
are themselves malleable. Under this proposed rule, it would not matter 
whether the assailant is much larger than the declarant, whether the dec-
larant is aware of the particularly violent or unpredictable nature of the 
assailant, whether the declarant harbors an unusual fear of the assailant, 
or whether the assailant was armed with a gun at the time of the attack. 
Indeed, nearly every factor discussed in Bryant would be irrelevant under 
my proposal.354 
                                                                                                             
(applying Bryant and deeming testimonial robbery victims’ statements to a detective that were made 
four days after one alleged robbery and several hours after another because “there was no evidence 
of any immediate threat to either the witnesses or the detective”). 
 351. In the Fourth Amendment context, the Supreme Court employed a similar logic in 2009 
when it reversed the longstanding rule of New York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454, 462–63 (1981) (deter-
mining that items seized in the warrantless search of a passenger compartment of a vehicle incident 
to a lawful custodial arrest were lawfully seized during the exigencies of the situation and such sei-
zure did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution); see Arizona v. 
Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (“[I]n most cases the vehicle’s passenger compartment will not 
be within the arrestee’s reach at the time of the search.”). 
 352. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 353. Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 (emphasis removed); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 51 (2004) (defining testimonial statements as “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 354. See supra notes 96–110 and accompanying text for a list of the factors discussed in 
Bryant. 
2012] Evading Confrontation 523 
Second, my proposed rule will no longer require courts to analyze 
either the declarant’s or the interrogator’s primary purpose.355 Rather, my 
proposed rule is based on presumptions—ones dependent upon the actual 
status of the assailant at the time of an interrogation and, consequently, 
the actual nature of any ongoing threat to the declarant. If the assailant 
has been captured by police, or if the assailant has been separated from 
the declarant, as in Davis, then my proposed rule would automatically 
deem the declarant’s statements testimonial. This rule would apply re-
gardless of whether the declarant knew of the assailant’s status, and re-
gardless of what a court later believes the declarant may or may not have 
intended. Likewise, if the assailant has reached a point of safety, this rule 
would automatically deem the declarant’s statements testimonial. Thus, 
it simply would not matter whether any would-be declarant knew or did 
not know of an assailant’s capture. Indeed, courts would not be required 
to ask what the declarant knew at the time the relevant out-of-court 
statements were made, as the test hinges on the fact of capture or escape, 
rather than any individual’s apparent purpose. To preserve the bright-line 
nature of this rule, and to eliminate the unlimited judicial discretion inhe-
rent in Bryant’s totality-of-the-circumstances test, the proposed res ges-
tae limitation must remain free of extraneous considerations such as 
these. 
Third, by relying on the concept of res gestae, this rule comes 
ready-made with a relatively clear set of rules, making results more pre-
dictable. The current test employs countless factors and provides no indi-
cation as to which way each factor cuts. My proposed rule imposes a 
more definite line between nontestimonial and testimonial statements. 
Under my proposal, courts would simply examine evidence relating to 
precisely when the assailant was either (1) captured by police, thereby 
ending the threat to the declarant and moving the focus to evidence pre-
servation; or (2) successful in evading the pursuing police, creating an 
alternative line in the event of noncapture. This analysis, which would 
usually be resolved by reference to routine police reports, is far simpler 
than the analysis required by Bryant. For example, in the event of arrest, 
police will usually record the name of the person arrested; the date, time, 
and place of the arrest; and the offense for which the person was ar-
rested.356 Similar rules apply to individuals not arrested but taken into 
                                                 
 355. See, e.g., Orenstein, supra note 316, at 1438–39 (“Both the definition of testimonial 
statements and of forfeiture rely on slippery notions of intent, which seems like an odd way to en-
force a categorical constitutional right.”). 
 356. Upon arrest, most suspects are promptly taken to the police station or a jail for “booking.”  
Pursuant to this process, the arrestee’s name, the time of the arrest or booking, and the offense of 
arrest are noted in a police “blotter” or “log.” See Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 
605 (1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing that booking is required in most jurisdictions, and 
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custody.357 This evidence would in turn create a clear line for when the 
res gestae has ended—one that can be easily verified by a reviewing 
court.358 
Fourth, the time limitations imposed by this proposed rule would 
prevent the continued expansion of the concept of ongoing emergency, 
under which virtually any report of a past violent crime in which a sus-
pect is still at large can be deemed nontestimonial.359 Under existing case 
law, police can plausibly claim that a potential threat to the police or 
public persists through the first few hours after a violent act, as was ar-
gued in Bryant.360 My proposed rule would curtail this potentially vast 
expansion of the category of nontestimonial hearsay by eliminating the 
possibility of an indefinite res gestae period, a result consistent with 
statements of the Bryant majority.361 
                                                                                                             
depicting the booking process as “an administrative record of an arrest . . . made on the police arrest 
book indicating, generally, the name of the person arrested, the date and time of the arrest or book-
ing, the offense or which he was arrested, and other information”). Following booking, arrest infor-
mation is often subject to public disclosure. See Sadiq Reza, Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or 
Suspect: In Search of a Right, In Need of a Rule, 64 MD. L. REV. 755, 821–26 (2005) (noting that 
state open-records statutes generally require public access to arrestee information); see also Gifford 
v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 631 A.2d 252, 258 (Conn. 1993) (noting a statutory disclosure obliga-
tion regarding arrest that requires public disclosure of the “name and address of the person arrested, 
the date, time and place of the arrest and the offense for which the person was arrested”). 
 357. In the Miranda context, “custody” occurs when a suspect has either been arrested or when 
a reasonable person would believe he has been detained in a manner effectively equivalent to arrest.  
See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). Louisiana statutes, typical of many state sta-
tutes, require extensive booking processes for all persons taken into custody, whether formally ar-
rested or not. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 201 (2003) (defining “arrest” as “the taking of 
one person into custody by another,” marked by “an actual restraint of the person”); id. art. 228 
(setting forth Louisiana’s post-arrest booking requirements, including the “duty of every peace offic-
er making an arrest . . . promptly to conduct the person arrested to the nearest jail or police station 
and cause him to be booked,” and mandating “an entry, in a book kept for that purpose, showing [the 
arrestee’s] name and address . . . [and] the date and time of booking,” and noting that “booking 
information summaries shall always be open for public inspection”). 
 358. See Caledonian Record Pub. Co. v. Walton, 573 A.2d 296, 297–301 (Vt. 1990) (noting a 
“general consensus” among the states that include arrest records within public disclosure laws, and 
concluding that both arrest records and records of citations must be disclosed). 
 359. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 722 N.W.2d 136, 147–48 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that 
questioning by police the day following the incident was still part of an ongoing emergency). 
 360. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1164 (2011) (“At no point during the questioning [of 
the declarant] did either [the declarant] or the police know the location of the shooter. In fact, Bryant 
was not at home by the time the police searched his house [over two hours later].”); see also id. at 
1172–73 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s holding, in which the majority effectively 
interpreted the ongoing emergency to exist until the police had learned of Bryant’s motive and loca-
tion after the shooting, perhaps even up to two-and-a-half hours later). 
 361. Id. at 1164–65 (“This is not to suggest that the emergency continued until Bryant was 
arrested in California a year after the shooting. We need not decide precisely when the emergency 
ended because Covington’s encounter with the police and all of the statements he made during that 
interaction occurred within the first few minutes of the police officers’ arrival and well before they 
secured the scene of the shooting—the shooter’s last known location.” (citations omitted)). 
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Fifth, my proposed rule creates a closer match between trial testi-
mony and out-of-court statements that serve a similar purpose. Testimo-
ny taken at trial nearly always occurs when an assailant is in police cus-
tody.362 Statements made by an out-of-court declarant under circums-
tances similar to those at trial—when the assailant has been captured and 
no longer poses a threat to the declarant—should be treated no different-
ly than similar testimony taken at trial. In both sets of circumstances, the 
need for cross-examination is the same. My proposed res gestae rule 
creates the necessary consistency. 
Finally, there is precedent to support this proposal. Courts of at 
least one state have already applied the res gestae rule in resolving a 
Confrontation Clause claim post-Bryant. For example, in Philpot v. 
State,363 (an opinion issued a few weeks after Bryant) the Court of Ap-
peals of Georgia held that a prior victim’s statements to police, in which 
she identified defendant Philpot as the burglar of her residence and de-
scribed his actions in a manner consistent with the current charges 
against him, were nontestimonial and thus not subject to the Confronta-
tion Clause.364 In reaching that result, the court found it significant that 
“the officer responded to the prior victim’s 911 call within just a few mi-
nutes and found her to still be ‘shaken up’ . . . as he questioned her in the 
                                                 
 362. Under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, criminal defendants have a right to 
be personally present at trial. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987). This right typically 
includes the right to be present when witnesses testify at trial. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 
(1990) (“‘[T]he Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,’ a 
preference that ‘must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of 
the case.’” (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004) and Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895))). A defendant’s right to 
be present at trial is further protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations where the defen-
dant is not actually confronting witnesses against him. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 
(1985). As a result, instances where a criminal defendant is not present for trial testimony are pre-
sumably rare. See People v. Concepcion, 193 P.3d 1172, 1176–77 (Cal. 2008) (discussing instances 
in which a defendant may be deemed to have waived his right to be present at trial, including cases 
of escape before trial and failure to return to trial while on bail). 
 363. Philpot v. State, 709 S.E.2d 831 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). 
 364. Id. at 838–39. 
[T]he officer who investigated the prior burglary testified that on the date in question, he 
responded within a few minutes to a report that a burglary had occurred only moments 
before . . . . Upon the officer’s arrival at the [site of the burglary], [the homeowner] told 
him that she heard a noise in her kitchen, and that when she went to investigate it, she 
saw a young man (later identified as Philpot) climbing into her home through the kitchen 
window while holding a knife. 
Id. at 838. She further told the officer that “once she began screaming, the young man fled”—facts 
that were very similar to those in the case at issue in this appeal. Id. “After speaking with the officer 
for a few more minutes, the prior victim looked out her window and exclaimed that the burglar 
(Philpot) was standing in the back yard of a home across the street.” Id. The officer then chased and 
eventually arrested Philpot. Id. 
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home’s kitchen.”365 As the court declared, these facts indicate that “the 
prior victim’s statements to the officer were admissible as part of the res 
gestae of the crime (which . . . is a relevant consideration under 
Bryant).”366 Moreover, at the time of these statements, “the armed perpe-
trator was still on the loose, and thus continued to pose a serious poten-
tial threat to the prior victim and her neighbors,” just as in Bryant.367 
These facts, according to the court, indicated that the victim’s statements 
were primarily offered to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency, 
making them nontestimonial.368 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Michigan v. Bryant, which makes constitutionality hinge upon a 
judge’s interpretation of the primary purpose of an out-of-court hearsay 
statement, has proven just as malleable as the test it replaced. As recent 
cases reveal, manipulation of the primary-purpose test occurs in many 
ways, including selective application of the Bryant factors, choosing the 
particular purpose among many concurrent purposes that justifies the 
desired end, and downplaying the testimonial nature of interrogations 
conducted by nonstate actors. 
As under Roberts, where multifactor tests were common, Bryant in-
structs courts to examine “all relevant information” specific to the case 
and to decide each case “in context,” a classic totality-of-the-
circumstances approach. Also, post-Bryant courts have drawn opposite 
inferences from the same Bryant factors and have made constitutionality 
turn on trivialities. Thus, like the discredited Roberts standard, the prima-
ry-purpose test yields unpredictable results and provides easy means to 
evade the Sixth Amendment’s protections. 
Crawford was intended to eliminate the malleability of the Roberts 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach, yet Bryant revives that very ap-
proach. To restore the promise of Crawford and eliminate the malleabili-
ty of Bryant, a bright-line test is needed. While no replacement test is 
perfect, my proposal would no longer require courts to consider motives, 
would make irrelevant most if not all of the Bryant factors, and would 
eliminate the easy means of manipulation within the existing framework. 
 
                                                 
 365. Id. at 838–39. 
 366. Id. at 839. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id. at 838–39. 
